International Law in the United States Court of Military Appeals by Carnahan, Burrus M
Boston College International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 3 | Issue 2 Article 2
8-1-1980
International Law in the United States Court of
Military Appeals
Burrus M. Carnahan
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr
Part of the Courts Commons, International Law Commons, and the Military, War and Peace
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law
School. For more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Burrus M. Carnahan, International Law in the United States Court of Military Appeals, 3 B.C. Int'l &
Comp. L. Rev. 311 (1980), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr/vol3/iss2/2
International Law in the 
United States Court of Military Appeals 
by BUTTUS M. CamoJaan· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Domestic courts have a special role in the development of international law . 
While executive agencies deal with international law more frequently than the 
courts, the decisions of the former are more often tainted by political, rather 
than purely legal, considerations. I Especially in the American system of 
government, the judiciary is said to have done far more for the interpretation, 
application and growth of international law than either of the other two 
branches of government. 2 
This article examines the international law decisions of a particular Ameri-
can court, the United States Court of Military Appeals (Court). Created by 
Congress in 1950 as a civilian 'supreme court' for the military justice system, 
the Court of Military Appeals is an 'Article I' court consisting of three judges 
appointed from civilian life for staggered 15-year terms.' 
In general, the Court reviews, for errors oflaw, court-martial convictions in 
which the accused has received a sentence including a punitive discharge from 
the service or confinement for more than one year. Most cases reach the Court 
either through petition of the accused or, on certification by the Judge Ad-
• Major, U.S. Air Force, Inlernational Law Division, Office of the Judge Advocate General; 
J.D., Northwestern University School of Law; LL. M., University of Michigan Law School. 
Major Carnahan was formerly an Associate Professor at the U.S. Air Force Academy. The views 
expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily represent official policy of the 
United States, the Department of the Air Force or any other government agency. 
1. See 1 G. SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 34 (3d ed. 1957) [hereinafter cited as 
SCHWARZENBERGER). 
2. Deale,ImrodU&titm, in 1 AM. INT'L L. CASES xi (F. Deale ed. 1971). 
3. See Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 67, 10 U .S.C. S 867 (1976). For surveys of the 
Court's history and jurisprudence, s. Cooke, 1M United SltlUs Court of Military Appeals, 
1975-1977: Judicializing tJu MilitaryJustue System, 76 MIL. L. REV. 43 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 
Cooke); Willis, The United States Court of Military Appeals: Its Origin, OperaJion and Future, 55 MIL. L. 
REV. 39 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Willis). 
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vocate General of the service concerned, though a few cases are disposed of 
through mandatory review or extraordinary writs.· 
First sitting in October, 1951, the Court has been active during two major 
armed conflicts as well as the post-W orId War II expansion of American bases 
overseas. It is not surprising, then, that the Court has decided a number of 
cases raising issues of international law . Although its decisions have appeared 
in collections of international law source materials,5 so far no attempt has been 
made to collect and analyze the various opinions of the court dealing with this 
subject. The primary purpose of this article is to systematically present the in-
ternationallaw jurisprudence of the Court, and thereby to bring attention to a 
previously ignored body of U.S. practice in international law. A subsidiary 
purpose will be to critique these decisions. After examining the common 
ancestry of international law and military law, the article will consider the 
Court's positions on several international legal issues, proceeding from such 
general issues as the nature and sources of international law to specific ques-
tions such as the customary status of visiting foreign forces and the interpreta-
tion of particular language in status.of forces agreements. The principal focus 
of the article will be on the 'law of peace' rather than the' law of war.' 
II. THE COMMON ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL AND MILITARY LAW 
Until the seventeenth century, both military law and international law were 
regarded as aspects of a greater common law of Europe whose origin was the 
civil law of ancient Rome. Rediscovered in the 1100's, for centuries Roman 
law was the only law taught in European universities. 6 Universally known and 
universally respected, it was applied to those international political and com-
mercial relations which were not felt to be appropriately subject to a local law 
such as the common law of England. Thus the Law Merchant, maritime law 
and the law of international relations were all governed by the civil law . 7 
Civil law jurists also dominated the field of British military law, at least up 
4. See Uniform Code of MilitaryJustice, arts. 66(b), 67(b), 10 U.S.C. U 866, 867 (1976). The 
three Judge Advocates General are the chief uniformed legal officers of the Army, Navy and Air 
Force. For the Coast Guard, this function is performed by the General Counsel of the Depart· 
ment of Transportation. See Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 1, 10 U.S.C. S 801(1) (1976). 
For a discussion of the Court's power to issue extraordinary writs, see Wacker, The 
"Unreviewable" Court-Martial Convictian: Supervisory Relief Under the All Writs Actfrom the United States 
Court of Mili14ry Appeals, 10 HARV. C. R. - C. L. L. REV. 33 (1975). 
5. E.g., United States v. Calley, 22 C.M.A. 534, 48 C.M.R. 19 (1973), excerpted in A. ROVINE, 
DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 505 (1973); United States v. 
Burney, 6 C.M.A. 776, 21 C.M.R. 98 (1956), reprinted in 23 I.L.R. 245 (1956); United States v. 
Weiman, 3 C.M.A. 216, 11 C.M.R. 216 (1953), rrprinted in 8 AM. INT'L L. CASES 381 (F. Deak 
ed. 1971). 
6. See R. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW, CASES - TEXT - MATERIALS 247-48 (3d ed. 
1970) [hereinafter cited as SCHLESINGER]; B. NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 
46-48 (1962). 
7. SeeJ. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 17-20 (6th ed. 1963); A. NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE 
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until the end of the English Civil War. 8 In large part this may have been due 
to the esteem which Elizabethans accorded to the ancient Romans in all things 
military. The military law of ancient Rome was felt to be more than adequate 
for turning modern Europeans into disciplined and effective soldiers.9 
International law and military law also share a common origin in the 
medieval Law of Arms, which applied to all nobles, knights and other men-at-
arms. Enforced by royal heralds and constables, it covered such matters as the 
rights and duties of prisoners of war, the division of ransoms, treason, and any 
other matter touching the 'honor' ora member ofthe military classes. to It thus 
combined elements of both military law and the international law of war. In 
England the Law of Arms was enforced by the Court of the Constable and 
Marshal. These high officers of state had military disciplinary powers, and 
many authorities .believe their Court was an ancestor of the modern court-
martial. lI Proceedings in this Court, too, were governed by the civil law. 
A. The Court and Modern Sources of Internati01ltJi Law 
1. Treaties 
Today, of course, Roman law is not an independent source of authority for 
either American military law or the law of nations. As stated in the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice, the primary sources of modern interna-
tionallaw are: 
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, estab-
lishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting States; 
HISTORY Of. THE LAW OF NATIONS 12, 74-75 (rev. ed. 1954) [hereinafter cited as NUSSBAUM); 
Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the NatioMI Law oftlu Unit.d States, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 26, 
27 (1952). Bid s .. SCHLESINGER, supra note 6, at 218-19. 
8. Se. F. WIENER, CIVILIANS UNDER MILITARY JUSTICE 165-67 (1967) [hereinafter cited as 
WIENER); G. SQUIBB, THE HIGH COURT OF CHIVALRY 7, 13 (1959)[hereinafter cited as SQUIBB); 
W. AYCOCK & S. WURFEL, MILITARY LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE 5 
(1955) [hereinafter cited as AYCOCK & WURFEL). 
9. S .. H. WEBB, ELIZABETHAN MILITARY SCIENCE 25-26, 37 (1965); if. C. BRAND, ROMAN 
MILITARY LAW 143-404,183 (1968). John Adams expressed similar sentiments while a member of 
a committee of the Continental Congress to revise the Articles of War as late as 1776. 
There was extant one System of Articles of War, which had carried two Empires to the 
head of Mankind, the Roman And the British: for the British Articles of War were only 
a literal Translation of the Roman: it would be in vain for US to seek ... for a more 
compleat System of military discipline .... 
III DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN ADAMS 409-10 (L. Butterfield ed. 1961), quol.d in 
Crump, Part I: A History of the Structure of MilitaryJustic. in the United States, 1775-1920, 16 A. F. L. 
REV. 41, 404 (1974). 
10. S .. SQUIBB, supra note 8, at 12-25; NUSSBAUM, supra note 7, at 69. See gmerally M. KEEN, 
THE LAWS OF WAR IN THE LATE MIDDLE AGES 23-404 (1965). 
11. Se', •. g., AYCOCK & WURFEL, supra note 8; Stuart-Smith, Military Law: Its History, Ad-
ministration and Practice, MIL. L. REV. 25, 27-28 (Bicentennial Issue, 1975). But s .. SQUIBB, supra 
note 8, at 8-10. 
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h. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted 
as law; 
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized na-
tions.. 12 
Conventions, or treaties, are of course part of the "supreme Law of the 
Land" under the federal constitution, and the Court of Military Appeals (the 
Court) has expressly acknowledged that treaties are part of the law which it 
will apply.u It has, for example, held ·that treaties and international agree-
ments can give powers to American military commanders which they might 
not otherwise possess. a The Court has also taken judicial notice, on appeal, of 
international agreements which were not included in the record of trial. IS 
2. Custom and General Principles 
Customary international law also "is part of our law, and must be ascer-
tained and administered by the courts of justice . . . as often as questions of 
right depending upon it are duly presented .... "16 The third major source of 
international law - general principles recognized by civilian nations - has 
not, however, received the same attention from federal courts as the first two. 
12. STATUTE OF THE I.C.J., art. 38, para. l(d) establishes that "judicial decisions and the 
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for 
the determination of rules of law." [d. para. 1( d). The actual law-creating processes are, how-
ever, limited to those described in subparagraphs (a) through (c). /d. paras. l(a), (b), (c). Sub-
paragraph (d) merely' states" some of the means for the determination of alleged rules of interna-
tional law." SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note I, at 26. 
13. Autry v. Hyde, 19 C.M.A. 433, 42 C.M.R. 35 (1970). The Court has not distinguished 
treaties from executive agreements. For cases in which the Court has used executive agreements 
as a source oflaw, see United States v. Wilmot, 11 C.M.A. 698, 29 C.M.R. 514 (1960); United 
States v. Robertson, 5 C.M.A. 806, 19 C.M.R. 102 (1955). In 1956, an intermediate military 
appellate court, the Air Force Board of Review, held that an executive agreement could not limit 
the jurisdiction which American courts-martial had been given by an Act of Congress. United 
States v. Copeland, 21 C.M.R. 838 (A.F.B.R. 1956). Cj Smallwood v. Clifford, 286 F. Supp. 97 
(D.D.C. 1968). 
14. Set, e.g., United States v. Manos, 17 C.M.A. 10,37 C.M.R. 274 (1967); if. United States 
v. Chasles, 9 C.M.A. 424,26 C.M.R. 204 (1958) (international agreement supports the charge 
that a "regulation" was violated by the accused); United States v. Smith, 9 C.M.A. 240, 26 
C.M.R. 20 (1958) ("regulation" is a valid implementation of a treaty obligation); Set generally 
Alley, The Overseas Commander's POWtr to Regulate the Private Life, 37 MIL. L. REV. 57, 115·20 
(1967). 
15. United States v. Schnell, 23 C.M.A. 464, 50 C.M.R. 483 (1975). 
16. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). For early federal cases applying 
customary international law, Set, e.g., The Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. 1 (1 Pet.) (1826); Brown v. 
United States, 12 U.S. 110 (8 Cranch) (1814). Set also Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the 
NatioNJI Law of the United States II, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 792, 816-32 (1953). The qualifying phrase 
"duly presented" may be an indirect reference to the "political questions" doctrine. Set L. 
HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 210-16 (1972). While the exact limits of this 
doctrine are far from clear, at a minimum it apparently means that the courts will not rule on 
whether the United States is lawfully participating in a particular armed conflict. Set, e.g., United 
States v. Berrigan, 283 F. Supp. 336 (D. Md. 1968), Ctrt. denied, 397 U.S. 909 (1970); United 
States v. Johnson, 17 C.M.A. 246, 38 C.M.R. 44 (1967). 
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The comprehensive research in comparative law which this technique requires 
has perhaps discouraged its use by litigants and judges in the United StatesY 
Nevertheless, the Court of Military Appeals attempted, with some success, to 
apply this source in the case of United States v. Schultz. 18 
In 1950 John G. Schultz was the driver of a car which struck and killed two 
pedestrians in Nagoya, Japan. At the time of the accident Schultz was an 
American civilian accompanying the U.S. armed forces inJapan; he was thus, 
as the law was then understood, amenable to trial by court-martial. 19 Found 
guilty of negligent homicide, he was sentenced to one year's confinement and 
a $1,000 fine. 
Between the time of the accident and the time of his arrest, however, his 
employment with the U.S. occupation forces had terminated and he had 
reverted to the status of an ordinary 'commercial entrant' inJapan. After in-
termediate appellate proceedings had run their course, the Judge Advocate 
General of the Air Force brought the case to the Court of Military Appeals by 
certifying three questions to the Court, including "[w]hether the court-martial 
had jurisdiction of the accused and of the offenses charged." 20 
Though the Court of Military Appeals held that Schultz was no longer" ac-
companying the armed forces" at the time of trial, it still upheld military juris-
diction based on Article of War 12, which provided that: 
General courts-martial shall have power to try any person subject 
to military law for any crime or offense made punishable by these 
articles, and any other person who by the law of war is subject to 
trial by military tribunals .... 21 
Speaking through Chief Judge Quinn, the Court held that as the occupying 
power in post-World War II Japan, the United States had the right under 
"judicially recognized concepts of international law' , to establish tribunals in 
17. Cj SCHLESINGER, supra note 6, at 32. 
18. United States v. Schultz, 1 C.M.A. 512, 4 C.M.R. 104 (1952). 
19. The Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 2(11), 10 U .S.C. S 802(11)(1976), authorizes 
court-martial jurisdiction over civilians "serving with, employed by, or accompanying the armed 
forces" ouiside the United States. In McElroy v. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960), and Grisham 
v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960), the Supreme Court held that this provision could not constitu-
tionally be applied to civilian employees in peacetime. At the time of Schultz's trial the Uniform 
Code was not yet in force. Therefore, he was tried under its predecessor statute, the Articles of 
War, 10 U.S.C. S 1471 (repealed 1950), article 2(d) of which also authorized trial of "persons ac-
companying or serving with" the Army outside the United States. Schultz, 1 C.M.A. at 516, 4 
C.M.R. at 108. 
20. 1d. 
21. Article of War 12, 10 U.S.C. S 1483 (repealed 1950), quoted in Schultz, 1 C.M.A. at 519, 4 
C.M.R. at 111. Similar language now appears in Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 18, 10 
U.S.C.S 818 (1976). A general court-martial is the most serious form of court-martial in the 
American armed forces. Composed of a military judge and at least five "members," who func-
tion similarly to a jury, it may adjudge any penalty permitted by law, up to and including the 
death penalty. Uniform Code of Military Justice, arts. 16, 18, 10 U.S.C. SS 816,818 (1976). 
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Japan with jurisdiction over American civilians in that country. The court-
martial therefore had jurisdiction over Schultz" as a person subject to the law 
of war - not as a person subject to military law. "22 
The Court then considered whether the offense of which the accused had 
been convicted - negligent homicide - was one of which a court operating 
under the law of war could take cognizance. It found that such tribunals could 
punish two general categories of offenses: (1) crimes against the civilian 
population under the 'common law of war,' and (2) crimes punishable under 
the 'law in effect' in the occupied territory.23 While the Court eventually 
found that negligent homicide was part of the 'law in effect' in occupied 
Japan, it chose to first consider whether this offense was generally cognizable 
under the 'common law of war.' 
The term 'common law of war' originated with the Instructions for the Govern-
ment of Armies oj the United Seates in the Field (Instructions) issued by the U.S. 
Army as General Order #100 in April, 1863.2• These Instructions, drafted by 
Dr. Francis Lieber, were the first modern codification of the law of war and 
exercised great influence over the later Hague Conventions on Land Warfare 
of 1899 and 1907. 25 The term was later used by the Supreme Court in Ex Pa1# 
Vallandigham,26 and in the government argument in Ex Pa1# Quirin. 27 The 
opinion in the Schultz case remains, however, the most complete discussion of 
this concept. 
Chief Judge Quinn began by noting that the common law of war "finds its 
basis in the customs and usages of civilized nations," and is, therefore, a 
largely unwritten law. 
In deciding whether a given offense constitutes a crime under the 
common law of war, we have no single source which will provide a 
ready answer. This law is nowhere precisely codified. We note, 
however, that certain crimes are universally recognized as proper-
ly punishable under the law of war. These include murder, man-
slaughter, robbery, rape, larceny, arson, maiming, assaults, 
burglary, and forgery. [citations omitted] The test bringing these 
offenses within the common law of war has been their almost 
universal acceptance as crimes by the nations of the world. 28 
22. Schultz, 1 C.M.A. at 521, 4 C.M.R. at 113. On the right of an occupying power to 
establish tribunals in occupied territory, s" generally G. VON GLAHN, THE OCCUPATION OF 
ENEMY TERRITORY 110-12 (1957). 
23. Schultz, 1 C.M.A. at 522-24, 4 C.M.R. at 114-16. 
24. U.S. ARMY, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN 
THE FIELD, art. 13 (General Order #100 1863) [hereinafter cited as U.S. ARMY INSTRUCTIONS], 
1IfJrinted in 1 THE LAW OF WAR, A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 158, 160 (L. Friedman ed. 1972) 
[hereinafter cited as LAW OF WAR]. 
25. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 7, at 227,345. 
26. 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243,249 (1863). 
27. 317 U.S. I, 13 (1942). 
28. Schultz, 1 C.M.A. at 522, 4 C.M.R. at 114. The list of offenses was taken from U.S. WAR 
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The Court then concluded that "all of the crimes which, historically, have 
been treated as violations of the law of war include an element of animus 
criminalis," i. t., a criminal intent. 29 The military offense of negligent 
homicide, however, requires no more than simple or ordinary negligence on 
the part of the accused. 30 The inquiry then turned to whether the historical list 
of offenses had now become out of date. 
Conceding that the law of war is not static, the Court assumed that" a crime 
may become a violation of the law of war if universally recognized as an of-
fense even though it contains no element of specific criminal intent. "31 But 
after a "careful perusal of the penal codes of most civilized nations," the 
Court concluded that imposing criminal liability for causing death through or-
dinary negligence is a "relatively new concept" which had not yet attained 
universal acceptance by the world's nations. 32 Negligent homicide was not, 
therefore, a crime under the 'common law of war.' 
In comparing this treatment of the 'common law of war' with the concept of 
'general principles of law recognized by civilized nations,' several things 
should be noted. The latter concept is itself a primary source of international 
law, along with treaties and custom. In Schultz, on the other hand, the Court 
apparently asked whether negligent homicide was "universally recognized as 
an offense" only because this standard had been previously established by 
customary intemationallaw." In a sense, of course, all international law can 
be traced back to custom; even treaties are based on the customary principle of 
pa&1II. sunl servanda. 3• 
Another distinction between the Court's approach and the 'general prin-
DEP'T, THE RULES OF LAND WARFARE para. 355 (F.M. 27-10 1940) [hereinafter cited as U.S. 
WAR DEP'T] , and W. WINTHROP, MIUTARY LAw AND PRECEDENTS 839 (2d ed. 1920) 
[hereinafter cited as WINTHROP]. The list ultimately stems from U.S. ARMY INSTRUCTIONS, 
supra note 23, art. 47, reprinted in LAW OF WAR, supra note 23, at 167. Lieber's list of "[c)rimes 
punishable by all penal codes" included arson, murder, maiming, assaults, highway robbery, 
theft, burglary, fraud, forgery and rape." /d. The addition of "manslaughter" to a list ofuniver-
sally recognized crimes is curious, since it is a distinctly common law offense. Winthrop included 
manslaughter, too, but in a list of offenses triable during martial law in the United States rather 
than a list of offenses under the law of war. WINTHROP, supra, at 839. In the 18th century the 
BritishJudge Advocate General ruled that a court-martial should not convict a prisoner of man-
slaughter since this offense was peculiar to the common law of England, and courts-martial en-
forced an entirely different body oflaw. See WIENER, supra note 8, at 112. Wienertracesthis result 
to the civil law origins of military law. Id. at 111. Manslaughter is specifically denounced in the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 119, 10 U.S.C. § 919 (1976). 
29. Schultz, 1 C.M.A. at 523, 4 C.M.R. at 115. 
30. /d. U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, para. 
213, at 28-80 (rev. ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as 1969 COURTS-MARTIAL MANUAL]; AYCOCK &: 
WURFEL, supra note 8, at 308-09. 
31. Schultz, 1 C.M.A. at 523, 4 C.M.R. at 115. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. See 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw 28 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht 195~); H. KELSEN, 
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 314 (1952). 
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ciples of law' concept is that the Court was searching not for universally 
recognized principles, but rather for universally punished crimes. In the context 
of the Schultz case, however, this distinction was more apparent than real. 
While the opinion claimed to be comparing specific 'crimes' and 'offenses' in 
the world's legal systems, in fact the Court was seeking a general principle -
the principle of criminal liability for simple negligence, 
Finally, it should be pointed out that the Court was fortunate that its search 
had negative results. It is relatively easy to prove that a certain principle is not 
'recognized by civilized nations;' all one need do is find a significant number 
of legal systems which do not employ the concept in question. To conclude 
that a principle of law is 'recognized by civilized nations' is a far more de-
manding task since at a minimum it requires an examination of all the prin-
cipallegal systems of the world. The examination would have to be more than 
merely a superficial reading of national codes, too, since the gloss placed on 
these by judicial decisions and scholarly writing often leads to practical results 
quite different from those which a literal reading would suggest. 35 
Indeed, the Schultz opinion itself was rather ambivalent on exactly how 
widely recognized an offense must be in order to be accepted as part of the 
'common law of war.' In some places the Court referred to crimes punishable 
by the penal codes of" all civilized nations," and to "universally recognized" 
offenses. 36 Elsewhere, however, it was satisfied with "almost universal" ac-
ceptance,37 and finally revealed that its own research involved merely the 
penal law of "most" civilized nations. 38 
Whatever difficulties may exist with the Schultz opinion, however, it clearly 
demonstrates the willingness of the Court of Military Appeals to apply 
customary international law and 'general principles of law recognized by 
civilized nations' in appropriate cases. 
III. THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
In the Case of the S.s. Lotus, the Permanent Court of International Justice 
was presented with conflicting theories on the nature of international law. 39 
The main issue in this case, which arose from a collision at sea between a 
French vessel and a Turkish vessel, was whether Turkey had violated interna-
tionallaw by subjecting an officer on the French vessel to penal liability . The 
French government contended that in order to have jurisdiction over this of-
35. Su SCHLESINGER, supro. note 6, at 32-33; if. THE LAw OF TIiE NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST 
81-84 (H. Liebesnyed. 1975). 
36. SelaulJz, 1 C.M.A. at 522, 4 C.M.R. at 114. 
37. 1d. 
38. Id. at 523, 4 C.M.R. at 115. 
39. [1927J P.C.I.J., aer. A, No. 10. 
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fense the Turkish government would have to point to some recognized rule of 
international law allowing it to extend its law to this type of situation.·o 
Turkey, on the other hand, argued that it should be allowed to take any action 
it wished so long as that action did not "come into conflict with a principle of 
international law.' '.1 The Court adopted the latter view, saying that it was 
"dictated by the very nature and existing conditions of international law. ".2 
Since international law governs relations between independent, sovereign 
states, "[r]estrictions upon the independence of states cannot therefore be 
presumed. ' '.3 In other words, international law is prohibitive law; anything not 
forbidden by it is permitted. 
The opinion of the World Court on any question of international law is, of 
course, highly authoritative. In SS Lotus the Court was evenly divided, 
however, and the decision in favor of Turkey was the result of the extra tie-
breaking vote of the President." Therefore, some doubt may remain on this 
matter. 
Though it never cited the S.S Lotus opinion, the Court of Military Appeals 
took a very similar view of international law in United States v. Weiman. +5 The 
accused, Weiman and Czertok, were Polish nationals employed by the U.S. 
Army in France. Convicted of larceny by a court-martial, on appeal they 
asserted lack of jurisdiction. Resolution of this issue required the Court of 
Military Appeals to apply Article 2( 11) of the Code, which gave the courts-
martial jurisdiction over "all persons serving with, employed by, or accom-
panying the armed forces" outside the United States, "[s]ubject to the provi-
sions of any treaty ... or to any accepted rule of international law. ".6 
In applying the phrase "subject to ... any accepted rule of international 
law," the Court could either have attempted to find a rule authorizing 
jurisdiction over persons in the situation of the accused, or it could have 
sought to determine whether any rule prohibited jurisdiction. The Court 
chose the latter course, asking "whether any accepted principle of interna-
tional law precludes such jurisdiction."H After reviewing scholarly articles 
and American judicial precedents, the Court concluded that no such principle 
existed, and affirmed the convictions.·8 
While the Court has often adhered to the prohibitive view of international 
law, at other times it has seemingly rejected this approach. In the Schultz case, 
40. Id. at 18. 
41. Idj 
42. Ii 
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 32. 
45. 3 C.M.A. 216, 11 C.M.R. 216 (1953). 
46. Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 2(11), 10 U.S.C. S 802(11)(1976). See also note 19 
supra. 
47. United States v. Weiman, 3 C.M.A. at 219,11 C.M.R. at 219. 
48. Id. at 219-20, 11 C.M.R. at 219-20. 
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discussed supra,49 the Court did not ask whether the 'common law of war' pro-
hibited the punishment of negligent homicide, but rather whether this offense 
was widely enough recognized to be accepted as part of that law. Schultz may 
actually represent an example of the prohibitive approach, however. The 
universally recognized crimes which the Court lists as being part of the' com-
mon law of war' (murder, manslaughter, rape, etc.) were originally offenses 
which an occupying power was forbidden to permit in occupied territory; the 
occupying power was not merely' allowed' to punish these offenses, it was re-
quired to suppress them. 50 
In Schultz, the Court of Military Appeals reversed this principle. The crimes 
which the law of war required the United Stares to punish in occupied Japan 
came to form part of the outer limits of court-martial jurisdiction under the 
law of war. Thus, in standing the original concept of the common law of war 
on its head, the Court was doubtless influenced by the suspicion with which 
the American courts have traditionally viewed attempts to subject civilians to 
military jurisdiction. 51 To the extent that international law required it, but no 
further, the Court was willing to allow an American civilian to be tried by 
court-martial. 
As a practical matter, the Court may also have been influenced by the dif-
ficulties inherent in the prohibitive approach to international legal problems. 
Just as it is difficult to prove that a certain legal principle is 'universally 
recognized,' so it is difficult to prove that there is no legal rule forbidding a cer-
tain action, especially when many rules of international law are matters of 
custom, usage and 'general principles of law.' In this legal environment it is 
often easier to look for what has been accepted as lawful in the past, and use. 
such precedents as a guide to the legality of future actions. 
A. National Jurisdiction: Territorial 
When discussing state jurisdiction, jurisdiction to prescribe rules of law 
must be distinguished from jurisdiction to enforce such rules. A state's power 
to prescribe is much broader than its jurisdiction to enforce, since the latter 
power is normally limited to territory under its sovereignty or control. As 
4-9. Schultz, 1 C.M.A. 512, 4- C.M.R. 104- (1952). 
50. See U.S. WAR DEP'T, supra note 27; U.S. ARMY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 23, an. 4-7, 
reprinted in LAW OF WAR, supra note 23, at 167. Anicle 4-3 of the Regulations Annexed to the 
Hague Convention No. IV Respecting The Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. IS, 1907, 
36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539 (1911), requires the occupying power to "take all measures in his 
power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety. . .. " /d. Cj In r. 
Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (194-6). 
51. "[TJhe party claiming military jurisdiction over a civilian has the burden of establishing 
that jurisdiction is clearly conferred .... " Schultz, 1 C.M.A. at 516, 4- C.M.R. at lOS. S •• 
Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234- (1960); Exparle Milligan, 71 U.S. (4- Wall.) 2 (IS66); United 
States v. Averette, 19 C.M.A. 363, H C.M.R. 363 (1970). 
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stated by the International Court in S.S. Lotus, "the first and foremost restric-
tion imposed by international law upon a state is that - failing the existence 
of a permissive rule to the contrary - it may not exercise its power in any 
form in the territory of another [sJtate. "52 The Court of Military Appeals had 
the opportunity to apply this principle in United States v. Murphy. 53 
Sergeant Murphy had participated in a conspiracy with three other soldiers 
and a Korean, to steal and black-market U.S. government property. At his 
court-martial inJapan, the three Americans all refused to testify, claiming the 
privilege against self-incrimination set out in Article 31, Uniform Code of 
Military Justice. H The Korean, Kim Hangi, also claimed the privilege, but 
the law officer" refused to allow the claim and directed him to testify against 
Murphy, who was convicted of wrongfully disposing of government property. 
The Court of Military Appeals granted review "to determine whether the 
law officer's ruling, that a prosecution witness could not refuse to answer in-
criminating questions, was erroneous .... "56 In upholding this decision, the 
Court noted that: 
The law officer based his ruling on the principle that Hangi was a 
Korean national resident and employed in Japan; that he was not 
subject to the territorial jurisdiction of any American court; that he 
was not subject to prosecution by the United States; and, 
therefore, he could not claim the privilege .... 57 
Though the Court's language is quite condensed, there is a logical progres-
sion here. Hangi was physically within the sovereign territory of Japan; due to 
his nationality and the location of his residence and place of employment, he 
was unlikely to go to the United States. He was therefore outside the enforce-
ment jurisdiction of the United States (and likely to remain so). Since he need 
not fear American enforcement he need not fear self-incrimination, and there-
fore the privilege was denied to him. 
52. Case of the S.S. Lotus, (1927) P.C.l.j., ser. A, No. 10, at 18. 
53. 7 C.M.A. 32, 21 C.M.R. 158 (1956). 
54. "No person subject to this chapter shall compel any person to incriminate himself or to 
answer any question the answer to which may tend to incriminate him." Uniform Code of 
Military justice, art. 31(a), 10 U.S.C. S 831(a) (1976). 
55. Under the Uniform Code of Military justice, as passed in 1950, the "law officer" func-
tioned much as a federal judge, ruling on admissibility of evidence and other interlocutory mat· 
ters. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES para. 39 
(1951) [hereinafter cited as 1951 COURTS-MARTIAL MANUAL). These functions are now per-
formed by the military judge. Set 1969 COURTS-MARTIAL MANUAL, supra note 30, at para. 39(b). 
56. United States v. Murphy, 7 C.M.A. at 33, 21 C.M.R. at 159. 
57. /d. Since the witness complied with the law officer's direction to testify, the question of 
what authority the law officer had to give such an order was left unanswered. Other cases have 
noted the unavailability ofU .S. process to compel foreign witnesses to testify. See United States v. 
Burrow, 16 C.M.A. 94, 36 C.M.R. 250 (1966); United States v. Stringer, 5 C.M.A. 122, 17 
C.M.R. 122 (1954). But seej. SNEE & A. PYE, STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENTS AND CRIMINAL 
JURISDICTION 94-97 (1957), describing arrangements which several nations have made to pro· 
cure witnesses for foreign courts-martial sitting in their territory. 
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The bulk of the Murphy opinion dealt with other issues. 58 Nevertheless, the 
Court's unique position as a United States court exercising appellate jurisdic-
tion over U.S. tribunals sitting outside the United States gave it an unusual 
opportunity to reaffirm the principle of territorial sovereignty as a limit on the 
enforcement jurisdiction of states, even if only briefly. 
The Court has also had a similar opportunity to consider the international 
legal status of a particular category of enforcement action - the search for, 
and the seizure of, evidence of crime. That there is a close connection between 
the power of search and seizure and territorial sovereignty was suggested in 
United States v. Wilmot. 59 In Wilmot the key issue was whether a federal nar-
cotics statute applied to a U.S. military base in]apan. By its terms the statute 
applied to "territory under the control or jurisdiction" of the United States. 60 
Finding the statute applicable, the Court relied in part on the cession to the 
United States by ] apan of exclusive power to conduct searches and make 
seizures within the base area. "The right to make searches and to effect 
seizures," observed the Court, "is the right of the sovereign. "61 
In a long line of cases the Court has wrestled with the admissibility of 
evidence seized by foreign police under circumstances which depart from the 
standards of the fourth amendment. A recurrent theme running through these 
decisions is an awareness of the limits on U.S. enforcement jurisdiction in 
other countries. 
In the first of these cases, United States v. DeLeo,62 French police searched the 
accused's apartment, leased in a French city, in the presence of an observer 
from the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID). During the 
search, the American agent noticed and seized a piece of evidence connected 
with a separate incident. That evidence was later admitted at Corporal 
DeLeo's court-martial. 
In holding that the evidence had been properly admitted, the Court em-
phasized, along with other factors, the difficulties which would have faced the 
CID agent, Mr. Shumock, had he attempted to comply with American stand-
ards of search and seizure: 
The letters rogatory in the possession of the French inspector of 
police would not have justified the seizure under Federal law , and 
there is no showing that the French courts would have been willing 
58. Murphy, 7 C.M.A. at 34-37,21 C.M.R. at 160-63. 
59. 11 C.M.A. 698, 29 C.M.R. 514 (1960). 
60. Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act, 21 U.S.C. § 173 (1953) (repealed 1970) (current 
version at 21 U.S.C. § 801 (1970». 
61. [d. at 701,29 C.M.R. at 517. In the end, however, the Court merely held that the base 
was under "the control of the United States for a special purpose," and that the United States 
did not have "full and exclusive sovereignty" over it. /d. at 702, 29 C.M.R. at 518. Even this 
conclusion may have gone too far. See note 105 infra. 
62. 5 C.M.A. 148, 17 C.M.R. 148 (1954). 
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to issue other letters in connection with a purely intramural crime 
of the American Armed Forces. Should th,e French authorities 
have declined to aid him, when he returned thereafter to attempt a 
seizure of the papers, Mr. Shumock might well have run into 
serious difficulty. He would then have been proceeding to ac-
complish a search on French soil without the aid of local process. 
Doubtless his status would have been that of a trespasser -
perhaps not as to the accused, but certainly as to French Nationals 
owning property through which he might necessarily have sought 
ingress.65 
323 
In later cases the Court criticized, and eventually overruled, the holding in 
DeLeo. However, the Court has never failed to recognize the limits which ter-
ritorial sovereignty place on the U.S. armed forces overseas. In United States v. 
Schnell,64 for example, it was recognized that, even though it was "virtually 
certain" that charges investigated by West German police would eventually 
be tried before a United States court-martial, "it would still be necessary for 
American officials to obtain German assistance for a search of premises in the 
civilian community. ' '65 The majority opinion in United States v. Jordan, 66 which 
finally overruled DeLeo, disavowed any attempt "to infringe upon sovereignty 
of another nation by attempting to impose American constitutional standards 
on their legitimate methods of securing evidence. "67 Any right which 
American officials may have to search off-base must be based on international 
agreement with the territorial sovereign.68 
While the Court of Military Appeals has recognized the limits which inter-
national law places on enforcement action in the territory of another state, it 
has not always been willing to accord the individual accused standing to raise 
such issues. In United States v. Rubenstein69 the accused, a civilian employee ac-
companying the U.S. Air Force in Japan, fled that country while under 
military investigation for blackmarketing. After returning to the United 
States, he went to Korea as a 'commercial entrant.' There he was arrested by 
U.S. military authorities and sent to Japan for trial by court-martial. Follow-
ing the weight of American authority, the court held that, "even if it is as-
sumed that the accused was unlawfully seized in Korea and transported to 
Japan, he would have no grounds to complain of a lack of jurisdiction in the 
court-martial, for the power of a court to try a person for a crime is not im-
63. Id. at 161-62, 17 C.M.R. at 161-62. Query whether the French would have been obligated 
to assist. See notes 122-33 itifrtJ. 
64. 23 C.M.A. 464, 50 C.M.R. 483 (1975). 
65. /d. at 467 n.13, 50 C.M.R. at 486 n.n. 
66. 23 C.M.A. 525, 50 C.M.R. 664 (1975), modified, 1 M.J. 334 (C.M.A. 1976). 
67. 23 C.M.A. at 527,50 C.M.R. at 666. 
68. See United States v. Mitchell, 21 C.M.A. 340, 45 C.M.R. 411 (1972). 
69. 7 C.M.A. 523, 22 C.M.R. 313 (1957). 
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paired by the fact that he has been brought within the court's jurisdiction by 
reason of a 'forcible abduction.' "70 
B. National Jurisdiction: Extraterritorial 
While a nation's jurisdiction to enforce is, "failing a permissive rule to the 
contrary," limited to its own territory, jurisdiction to prescribe may be extra-
territorial. The Uniform Code of Military Justice is a primary example of an 
extraterritorial statute; Article 5 states that the Code" applies in all places. "71 
Under the prohibitive theory of international law , a state may prescribe rules 
applicable anywhere and to any person, so long as there is no conflict with in-
ternationallaw. 72 In United States v. Newvine,73 the Court of Military Appeals 
considered whether Article 5 of the Uniform Code created any such conflict. 
Newvine, an enlisted member of the Air Force, had murdered a woman in 
Mexico while off-duty. Convicted by a general court-martial sitting in Texas, 
on appeal the Court of Military Appeals considered, inter alia, whether the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice could be applied to this type of offense con-
sistently in accordance with international law. The Court cited United States v. 
Bowman7+ for the proposition that "prosecution of a person subject to Ameri-
can sovereignty in an American court for an act in violation of a statute of the 
United States which was committed by him within the jurisdiction of a foreign 
country 'is no offense to the dignity of or right of the sovereignty' of that coun-
try. "75 Therefore, the Court found no impediment in international law to the 
exercise of jurisdiction in this case. 
In several cases the Court has been faced with determining the extraterritor-
iality of federal criminal statutes other than the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice. The principles of jurisdiction applied in these cases include the na-
tionality principle (a state may prescribe conduct for its own nationals 
wherever they are),16 the objective territorial principle (a state may prescribe 
rules governing conduct that has an effect in its territory),77 and the protective 
principle (a state may prohibit conduct which threatens its security or the 
70. /d. at 530, 22 C.M.R. at 320; accord, Frisbie v. Collins, 34-2 U.S. 519 (1952); United States 
ex rei. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir.), cm. dmied, 4-21 U.S. 1001 (1975); Attorney-
General v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5 (Dist. Ct., Jerusalem 1961). 
71. Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 5, 10 U.S.C. S 805 (1976). 
72. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES S 
33 (1965); see also N. LEEGH, C. OLIVER & J. SWEENEY, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 
116-38 (1973). See generally W. FRIEDMAN, O. LISSITZYN & R. PUGH, INTERNATIONAL LAW 
530-32 (1969). 
73. 23 C.M.A. 208, 4-8 C.M.R. 960 (1974-). 
74-. 260 U.S. 94- (1922). 
75. United States v. Newvine, 23 C.M.A. at 210, 4-8 C.M.R. at 962. 
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES U 10, 
26-32 (1965). . 
77. ld. S 18. 
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operation of its governmental functions). 78 Perhaps because of its 'prohibitive' 
approach to international law, it has not, however, used these terms. The issue 
has come before the Court in several forms. 
Article 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice authorizes courts-
martial to "take cognizance of," among other offenses, "crimes and offenses 
not capital, of which persons subject to this [Code] may be guilty .... "79 This 
phrase operates as an assimilative crimes act, incorporating by reference all 
civilian federal criminal statutes into the Uniform Code. In United States v. 
Wilmot,80 for example, an Air Force member was tried by court-martial for 
violating the Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Acts l by introducing drugs 
into an American base in Japan. 
The Court of Military Appeals addressed the extraterritoriality issue in 
Wilmot by quoting extensively from the staff judge advocate's post-trial 
review, which the Court approved as a "thorough analysis of the issue:" 
[T]here is no Constitutional or international prohibition against 
United States criminal law extending to regulate American 
citizens' conduct on United States Forces, Japan, installations, 
else the Uniform Code of Military justice [sic] itself would be inef-
fective there; the United States has a vital interest in regulating 
narcotics traffic on these installations for it strikes at the heart of 
military prowess and proficiency; having that interest and being 
unimpeded by other prohibitions against the exercise of such juris-
diction, it would be flaunting reality to say that Congress did not 
intend to extend the proscription against importation to protect 
military installations in Japan as well as other executive, i.e., 
diplomatic, compounds there and in other foreign countries. 82 
Acting under the principle that statutes should IJe construed to avoid conflict 
with international legal obligations, the staff judge advocate concluded that 
78. See, e.g., United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 936 
(1968); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES S 10 
(1965). Even if one adopts a "prohibitive" approach to intemationallaw, accepted principles of 
jurisdiction may still be useful due to the difficulty of conclusively proving that a particular asser-
tion of jurisdiction is not prohibited. See text accompanying notes 44, 45 supra. Baxter has noted 
that, when examining U.S. cases on jurisdiction, "one is often hard put to determine whether the 
courts are applying a prohibitory rule of international law or, on the other hand, exercising a rule 
of national self-restraint or a presumption about congressional intention regarding the territorial 
application of a statute." Baxter, Forward, in 1 AM. INT'L L. CASES viii (F. Deak ed. 1971) 
[hereinafter cited as Baxter). 
79. Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 134, 10 U.S.C. S 934 (1976). 
80. 11 C.M.A. 698, 29 C.M.R. 514 (1960). 
81. 21 U.S.C. S 171 (1953) (repealed 1970) (current version at 81 U.S.C. § 801 (1976». 
82. 11 C.M.A. at 700, 29 C.M.R. at 516. The staff judge advocate, the commander's legal 
advisor, is required to submit a written opinion on the records of all general courts-martial con-
vened by the commander. See Uniform Code of Military Justice, arts. 6, 61,10 U.S.C. U 806, 
861 (1976). 
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the exercise of jurisdiction in Wilmot was consistent with international law . 83 
Note that he initially adopted a prohibitive approach, stressing that "there is 
no . . . international prohibition" against the suggested interpretation. 8+ 
However, he also asserted the importance of factors strongly connecting the 
case with the United States, including the citizenship of the accused (the na-
tionality principle) and the impact on military efficiency of drugs on an 
American base (the protective principle). The opinion goes too far in asserting 
that if these connecting factors were not sufficient, then the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice would, itself, lack extraterritorial effect, since membership in 
a nation's armed forces is itself a principle of jurisdiction.85 
Constitutional limits on court-martial jurisdiction may also require an 
assessment of the extraterritorial effect of statutes. In O'Callahan v. Parker, 86 the 
United States Supreme Court held that in order to protect a serviceman's 
right to jury trial the jurisdiction of courts-martial must be limited to offenses 
which are" service connected. "87 Since the right of jury trial in an Article III 
court was the chiefrationale for O'Callahan, the Court of Military Appeals held 
that the decision does not limit military jurisdiction if an Article III court 
could not try the offense charged.88 In Newvine, for example, no federal civil-
ian court could try the accused for murder committed in Mexico; the offense 
was, therefore, properly triable by court-martial, even though not "service 
connected.' '89 
In United States v. Black,90 the accused was charged with having entered into 
a conspiracy, while stationed in Vietnam, to buy heroin after his return to the 
United States. The government argued that, since the conspiracy had been 
formed outside the United States, O'Callahan did not apply.91 Rejecting this 
argument, the Court held that the offense of conspiracy had occurred in the 
United States, since that is where the overt act charged (mailing a letter) had 
taken place. 92 Here the court apparently applied the objective territorial 
theory of jurisdiction. Even though the conspiracy itself had been entered into 
outside the United States, the United States could claim territorial jurisdiction 
over this event since the overt act had an effect within American territory. 
83. See, e.g., Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64,118 (1804) 
(Marshall, C.J.); The Over The Top, 5 F.2d 838 (D. Conn. 1925). 
84. United States v. Wilmot, 11 C.M.A. at 700, 29 C.M.R. at 516. 
85. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES S 31 
(1965); if. United States v. Rodriguez, 2 C.M.A. 101,6 C.M.R. 101 (1952). 
86. 395 U.S. 258 (1969). 
87. /d. at 274. 
88. United States v. Newvine, 23 C.M.A. 208, 208-09, 48 C.M.R. 960, 960-61 (1974). 
89. /d. at 210, 48 C.M.R. at 962 (1974). See United States v. Keaton, 19 C.M.A. 64, 41 
C.M.R. 64 (1969). See generally Horbaly & Mullin, ExtraterritorialJurisdiction and Its Effect on the Ad-
ministration of Military Criminal Justice Overseas, 71 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1976). 
90. 1 M.J. 340 (C.M.A. 1976). 
91. /d. at 342. 
92. /d. at 343. 
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While in this case the effect was not itself criminal, it was, as an overt act, an 
essential element of the crime of conspiracy. In another sense, then, Black is 
based on subjective territorial jurisdiction, since part of the criminal act itself 
was committed in U. S. territory. 
As an alternative basis for applying O'CallaJuJn, the Court held that even if 
the conspiracy had been completed outside U. S. territory, the offense would 
still have been cognizable in aU. S. civilian court.93 The essence of Black's of-
fense, in the Court's view, was conspiracy to import heroin into the United 
States, an act denounced by civilian criminal statutes. In concluding that these 
statutes were intended to apply to extraterritorial conspiracies, the Court 
relied on the Supreme Court opinion in United States v. Bowman. 94 
There the Supreme Court held that whether a statute was to be applied ex-
traterritorially depended upon the intent of Congress, "as evinced by the 
description and nature of the crime, and upon the territorial limitations upon 
the power and jurisdiction of a government to punish crime under the law of 
nations. "95 In the case of ordinary crimes against private individuals, the 
assumption is that jurisdiction is limited to U.S. territory. If Congress intend-
ed otherwise, it is natural to assume that they would expressly so indicate in 
the statute. 
But the same rule of interpretation should not be applied to 
criminal statutes which are, as a class, . . . enacted because of the 
right of the government to defend itself against obstruction or 
fraud, wherever perpetrated, especially if committed by its own 
citizens, officers or agents. . . . In such cases, Congress has not 
thought it necessary to make specific provision in the law that the 
locus shall include the high seas and foreign countries, but allows it 
to be inferred from the nature of the offense. 96 
In international legal terminology, these statutes are based on the protective 
principle of jurisdiction. 
In Black the Court of Military Appeals found the offense of conspiracy to 
import illegal drugs to be within this latter category of federal offenses. Such 
conspiracies were said to "constitute not only threats to the integrity of our na-
tional borders but also obstructions to this Government's regulation of com-
merce with foreign nations."97 Since Black's crime was cognizable in a federal 
civilian court, the O'Callahan decision applied and a court-martial could not 
properly try him for this conspiracy. 
Finally, Article 3(a) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice may require 
93. [d. 
94. 260 U.S. 94 (1922). 
95. [d. at 97-98. 
96. [d. at 98. 
97. United States v. Black, 1 M.J. at 343. 
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the Court to assess the territorial application of statutes. 98 Article 3( a) provides 
that if a person commits an offense while subject to the Uniform Code, he is 
not "relieved from amenability to trial by court-martial by reason of the ter-
mination of that status," if the offense is punishable by more than five years 
confinement, and if "the person cannot be tried in the courts of the United 
States or of a State, a territory or the District of Columbia. "99 This Article has 
been held to overrule an old principle of military law that a serviceman cannot 
be tried during his present enlistment for an offense committed in an earlier 
enlistment. 100 
While in Japan, Electronic Technician Chief George Steidley, U.S. Navy, 
allegedly stole numerous items of government property ranging from shoes 
and bedsheets to padlocks and forceps. After many, but not all, of the thefts 
had occurred he reenlisted in the Navy. On appeal the Court of Military Ap-
peals, in United States v. Steidley,lOI reversed his conviction for the pre-reenlist-
ment offenses, holding that, under United States v. Bowman,I02 theft of U.S. 
government property is an extraterritorial offense, and that Steidley's crime 
was therefore punishable in a United States District Court. 103 Article 3(a) 
therefore was not applicable, and the court-martial lacked jurisdiction over 
those offenses. lo• 
None of these decisions are very surprising. Other American courts have, 
after all, applied the nationality, objective territorial and protective 
principles. 105 These decisions of the Court of Military Appeals may, however, 
have more significance than would appear superficially. Whenever, as in the 
Black and Steidlty cases, the Court decides an extraterritoriality issue for 
O'Callahan or Article 3(a) purposes, a ruling in favor of extraterritorial ap-
plication ironically serves to defeat U.S. military jurisdiction in the case at 
hand. In these situations the government will argue that the statute should be 
limited to application within U.S. territory. The accused argues to the con-
trary, exactly the opposite of the usual positions of the government and the 
defense whenever similar issues are raised in civilian courts. 
Inmost civilian cases upholding extraterritorial jurisdiction, the court rules 
in favor of the position of its own government. The persuasiveness of such 
decisions as evidence of international law is naturally weakened by the suspi-
98. Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 3(a), 10 U.S.C. S 803(a) (1976). 
99. ld. 
100. ComfHJre United States ex rei. Hirshberg v. Cooke, 336 U.S. 210 (1949) with United States 
v. Gallagher, 7 C.M.A. 506, 22 C.M.R. 296 (1957). 
101. 14 C.M.A. 108, 33 C.M.R. 320 (1963). 
102. 260 U.S. 94 (1922). 
103. United States v. Steidley, 14 C.M.A. 108, 33 C.M.R. 320 (1963). 
104. [d. at Ill, 33 C.M.R. at 323. 
105. See, e.g., Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932) (nationality); United States v. 
Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 936 (1968) (protective); Latham v. United 
States, 2 F.2d 208 (4th Cir. 1924) (objective territorial). 
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cion that the court has merely gone along with the national policies of its ex-
ecutive branch. This is not, however, true of decisions of the Court of Military 
Appeals on o 'Callahan and Article 3(a) issues. In those cases a finding of extra-
territorial jurisdiction is a finding opposed by the government; such cases 
may, therefore, have unusual persuasiveness as statements on the interna-
tional law of jurisdiction. When national courts "intentionally or uninten-
tionally express views which run counter to the practice of their own govern-
ments," then "they offer an extreme instance of judicial independence which 
gives to such pronouncements an exceptionally high . . . value," as evidence 
of international law. 106 
C. The Customary Law of Visiting Forces 
In S.S. Lotus the World Court held that, unless limited by a prohibitive rule, 
a state may generally exercise jurisdiction in its own territory; 107 conversely, 
no state may exercise jurisdiction in the territory of another, "failing the ex-
istence of a permissive rule to the contrary. "108 For many years there has been 
controversy over whether any prohibitive or permissive rules limiting the 
rights and powers of the territorial state exist in favor of friendly foreign armed 
forces stationed there. 
According to one view, the foreign force is completely immune from local 
jurisdiction and has exclusive criminal jurisdiction over its members. 109 At the 
other extreme is the view that the territorial sovereign has exclusive enforce-
ment jurisdiction over all persons in its territory, including members of 
visiting forces, unless that jurisdiction has been expressly waiv~d.IIO The basic 
problem facing adherents of both views is that there is almost no state practice 
on the subject prior to World War II. Further, since World War II the issue 
has generally been resolved by status of forces agreements between the send-
ing and receiving states. Scholarly writing on the subject tends to become an 
endless debate on the implications of the same cases, all, with the exception of 
The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, III decided between 1914 and 1945. 112 
In this state of the law, any new court decisions on the status of visiting 
106. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note I, at 34. 
107. Case of the S.S. Lotus, (1927) P.C.I.]., ser. A, No. 10, at 18-19. 
108. /d. 
109. See In re A.F., 12 Ann. Dig. 163 (No. 43) (Tribunal Correctionnel of the Isle of Chios, 
Greece 1945); King, Further Developments Concerning Jurisdiction Over Friendly Foreign Armed Forces, 40 
AM.]. INT'L L. 257 (1946) [hereinafter cited as King, Further Development.si; King,Jurisdiction Over 
Friendly Foreign Armed Forces, 36 AM.]. INT'L L. 539 (l942) [hereinafter cited as King,Jurisdiction). 
110. See Wilson v. Girard, 345 U.S. 524 (1957); Barton, Foreign Armed Forces: Qua/ifiedJurisdic-
tiona/Immuniry, 31 BRIT. V.B. INT'L L. 341 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Barton); Barton, Foreign 
Armed Forces: Immuniry from Crimina/Jurisdiction, 27 BRIT. V.B. INT'L L. 186 (1950). 
111. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). 
112. The confusion which exists is suggested by a Canadian case from World War II. In re Ex-
emption of United States Forces from Canadian law, 12 Ann. Dig. (No. 36) (Supreme Ct., 
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forces would assume importance. The Court of Military Appeals has decided 
several such cases in situations where for some reason no status of forces agree-
ment was applicable. The cases suggest answers to the following questions: 
(1) Are foreign military courts pe~mitted to exercise jurisdiction 
in the territory of another power? 
(2) Are foreign friendly armed forces subject to the enforcement 
jurisdiction of the territorial state? 
(3) Who may properly be considered a member of the foreign 
armed force? 
The Court faced the first and third issues in United States v. Weiman. 113 There 
the issue was whether U.S. military jurisdiction extended to a Polish national 
civilian employee of the U.S. Army in France, or, more precisely, whether 
such jurisdiction conflicted with "any accepted rule of international law. "lit 
At the time of trial the NATO Status of Forces Agreement was not in force. 
The Court found that the "decided weight of international law" supported 
"the right of a nation to exercise authority over its forces while in a friendly 
foreign nation,"115 and held that no conflict with international law existed. 
The opinion quoted extensively from Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in The 
Schooner Exchange, which concluded that "[t]he grant of free passage [to a 
foreign force] therefore implies a waiver of all jurisdiction over the troops dur-
ing their passage, and permits the foreign general to use that discipline and to 
inflict those punishments which the government of his army may require. "116 
Weiman clearly answers the first question in the affirmative: foreign armed 
forces may exercise enforcement jurisdiction in the territory of another state. 
Though not essential to the holding, quotations from The Schooner Exchange and 
Coleman v. Tennesseel l7 suggest that, ifposed, the answer to the second question 
would have been that the territorial state had no jurisdiction over Weiman and 
his accomplice. 1I8 
As to the third question, the Court had no difficulty assuming that Weiman, 
Canada 1942). The Governor-General had requested an advisory opinion from the Supreme 
Court on whether such forces were exempt from Canadian law. Two justices said that foreign 
forces had complete immunity, two that they had no immunity, but that in practice local 
authorities did not exercise their jurisdiction in certain cases, and one justice held foreign forces 
exempt from Canadian jurisdiction only with respect to offenses in camp or against another 
member of the force or the property of the foreign government. Id. 
113. 3 C.M.A. 216, 11 C.M.R. 216 (1953). 
114. /d. at 218, 11 C.M.R. at 218. 
115. /d. at 219, 1-1 C.M.R. at 219. 
116. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 140. 
117.97 U.S. 509(1878). 
118. E.g., "It is well settled that a foreign army, permitted to march through a friendly coun-
try or to be stationed in it, by permission of its government or sovereign, is exempt from the civil 
and criminal jurisdiction ofthe place." Id. at 515, cited in United States v. Weiman, 3 C.M.A. at 
219, 11 C.M.R. at 219. The Court also relied on King, Furtber Developments, supra note 84; King, 
Jurisdiction, supra note 84; and Barton, Foreign Armed Forces: Immunity.from Supervisory Jurisdiction, 26 
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a civilian employee of the U.S. Army, though not an American national, 
should be considered a member of the U.S. forces in France. The Court was, 
however, careful to note that they were "not here concerned with nationals of 
a host nation, employed by our forces within the borders of such a nation." 119 
This caveat suggests that an attempt to bring the host nation's nationals under 
the military jurisdiction of the foreign force would be inconsistent with an "ac-
cepted rule of international law ." 120 
The Court next faced these issues in United States v. Robertson. 121 Robertson 
was a merchant seaman aboard a U.S. Department of Commerce vessel 
operated for the government by a private contractor under a General Agency 
Agreement. In 1953 the vessel carried cargo to japan for the U.S. Armed 
Forces, and while docked in Yokohama harbor Robertson killed a fellow 
seaman in a waterfront brawl. Though he was not a civil service employee, 
Robertson was tried by a Navy court-martial and convicted of unpremeditated 
murder. 122 
On appeal he contested the court-martial's jurisdiction arguing that while 
the Administrative Agreement between japan and the United States granted 
the latter exclusive jurisdiction over members of the 'civilian component' ac-
companying U.S. forces in that country, he was not part of the 'civilian com-
ponent. '125 After a careful consideration of both American and japanese ad-
ministrative practice under the Agreement, the Court agreed that Robertson 
was not part of the 'civilian component' as that term was used in the Agree-
ment. 124 
Another factor leading the Court to limit the meaning of the term 'civilian 
component' was that the United States had exclusive jurisdiction over persons 
in this category. Characterizing this as a type of' extraterritoriality,' similar to 
BRIT. V.B. INT'L L. 380 (194-9). The last article argued that the foreign force itself was immune 
from local court jurisdiction. In his later writings, Barton made clear his opinion that individual 
members of such a force could claim no similar immunity. See note 85 supra. 
119. Weiman, 3 C.M.A. at 218, 11 C.M.R. at 218. 
120. Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 2 (11), 10 U.S.C. S 802 (11) (1976). During the 
negotiation of the Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the 
Status of Their Forces, done June 19, 1951,4- U.S.T. 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 284-6, 199 U.N.T.S. 67 
[hereinafter cited as NATO SOFA], France objected to the inclusion of stateless persons and na· 
tionals of third countries in the civilian component of the sending state's forces. The compromise 
eventually adopted in Article I of the Agreement excludes employees of the visiting force who are 
stateless, nationals of the receiving state, or nationals of a state not part to the NATO alliance. See 
Snee, NATO Agrennmts on Status: Trauaux Priparatoires, 54- U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE INT'L LAW 
STUDIES 165 (1961) [hereinafter cited as SNEE). If the NATO SOFA had been in force at the time 
of Weiman, 3 C.M.A. 216, 11 C.M.R. 216 (1953), the United States would not have had 
jurisdiction over the accused, who were Polish nationals. But see United States v. Robertson, 5 
C.M.A. 806, 19 C.M.R. 102 (1955). 
121. 5 C.M.A. 806, 19 C.M.R. 102 (1955). 
122. /d. at 808, 19 C.M.R. at 104-. 
123. /d. at 815, 19 C.M.R. at 111. 
124-. [d. at 818, 19 C.M.R. at 114-. 
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that once exercised by consular courts in 'uncivilized' countries, the Court 
went on to observe: 
A type of extraterritoriality was embodied in the doctrine of the 
famous Schooner Exchange case .. , . There, Chief Justice Mar-
shall stated that a visiting Army is immune from the jurisdiction of 
a friendly sovereign through whose. realm its troops pass .... 
However, some international lawyers - both in this country and 
abroad - have expressed grave doubt that this pronouncement 
constitutes a correct statement of international law . Consequently 
not a few of the countries in which American Forces have been sta-
tioned have asserted jurisdiction over t~ese troops, retainers and 
employees .... In light of the history of extraterritoriality, it may 
well be deemed more nearly suitable to the intendment of the con-
tracting parties that the Administrative Agreement between the 
United States and Japan be construed narrowly - particularly in-
sofar as the grant of exclusive jurisdiction is concerned. This, in 
turn, would imply a narrow construction of the phrase "civilian 
component." 125 
This highly critical attitude towards immunity for foreign armed forces 
marked a break with prior American authority, including the Court's own 
dicta in W timan. 126 
Although the Court accepted Robertson's argument that he was not 
covered by the Administrative Agreement, it nevertheless found that he was 
properly subject to U.S. military jurisdiction. 127 Under Article 2(11) of the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice, Robertson was still a civilian' accompany-
ing' the armed forces overseas, and the Court held that the United States and 
Japan had concurrent jurisdiction over him.l2s Since no treaty applied to 
Robertson's case, this jurisdiciton was necessarily founded on customary in-
ternational law. 
Robertson thus reaffirms the holding in Weiman that foreign armed forces 
may exercise jurisdiction in the territory of another state. The Court went be-
125. /d. at 819, 19 C.M.R. at 115. The extraterritorial regime which followed the occupation 
of Japan was of only brief duration. The agreement involved in United States v. Robertson,S 
C.M.A. 806, 19 C.M.R. 102 (1955), was the Administrative Agreement under Article III of the 
Security Treaty with Japan, Feb. 8, 1952,3 U.S.T. 334-1, T.I.A.S. No. 2492 [hereinafter cited 
~s Japan Administrative Agreement], which entered into force on April 28, 1952. On October 
29, 1953, it was superseded by the Protocol to Amend Article XVII of the Administrative Agree-
ment under Article III of the Security Treaty with Japan, Sept. 19, 1953, 4 U.S.T. 1846, 
T.I.A.S. No. 2848, which adopted the NATO SOFA jurisdictional formula. See text accompany-
ing notes 112-115 irifTa. At the time of the court's decision on May 27,1955, the extraterritorial 
aspects of the Administrative Agreement had already lapsed. 
126. See, e.g., 1951 COURTS-MARTIAL MANUAL, supra note 48, para. 12; 1 C. HYDE,INTER-
NATIONAL LAW, CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND ApPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES 819 (2d ed. 1945); 
King, Jurisdiction, supra note 109. 
127. Robertson,S C.M.A. at 820, 19 C.M.R. at 116. 
128. /d. 
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yond Weiman in holding that a foreign armed force includes, for jurisdictional 
purposes, anyone 'accompanying' it, even though not employed by it. 129 By 
way of dicta, the Court did mention one exception to this rule: "the exception 
suggested has to do with persons who are citizens of, or ordinarily resident in, 
Japan," or who "enjoyed some special bond" with that nation. 130 
Together, Weiman and Robertson established the proposition that visiting 
forces have the right to conduct courts-martial in the territory of other nations, 
and that this right extends to the trial of civilians accompanying the force, but 
not to local nationals in that position. The Court had not yet, however, 
squarely faced the issue of whether visiting forces are immune from local juris-
diction. This issue was reached in United States v. Sinigar. 131 
Sinigar, a Private in the U.S. Army stationed in Canada, was called to 
testify before a Canadian coroner's inquest. Since he did not 'see the point' of 
certain questions he refused to answer them and temporarily was committed 
to jail for contempt. 132 Thereafter, he was tried by an American court-martial 
for conduct discreditable to the armed forces, i.e., refusing to answer the 
coroner's questions. 153 
Before the Court of Military Appeals, Sinigar's counsel argued that he 
should not be "punished by both Canada and the United States for what he 
insisted was essentially one act."13+ The accused argued that the NATO 
Status of Forces Agreement135 prohibited a second trial, but the Court held 
this treaty to be inapplicable. u6 Since no treaty applied to Sinigar's case, the 
Court then considered whether customary international law prevented his trial 
by both sovereigns. Holding that it did not, the opinion noted that "inter-
national law has long recognized the possibility of two concurrent jurisdic-
tions," and that in this case "jurisdiction in the United States springs from its 
129. Cf Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, August 12, 1949, an. 
4A(4), 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, which grants prisoner of war status to civilian persons 
"who accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof." But if. Chow Hung 
Ching v. The King, 15 Ann. Dig. 147 (No. 47) (High Coun, Australia 1948) (Civilian laborers 
not a foreign armed force entitled to immunity although under military discipline). 
130. RobtTlson, 5 C.M.A. at 820, 19 C.M.R. at 116. 
131. 6 C.M.A. 330, 20 C.M.R. 46 (1955). 
132. /d. at 333,20 C.M.R. at 49. 
133. /d. The charge was laid under Anicle 134, the 'general article,' of the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice: 
Though not specifically mentioned in this chapter, all disorders and neglects to the 
prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces, all conduct of a nature to 
bring discredit upon the armed forces, and crimes and offenses not capital, of which 
persons subject to this chapter may be guilty, shall be taken cognizance of by a general, 
special or summary court-martial, according to the nature and degree of the offense, 
and shall be punished at the discretion of that coun. 
Uniform Code of Military Justice, An. 134, 10 U .S.C. S 934 (1976). 
134. United States v. Sinigar, 6 C.M.A. at 336,20 C.M.R. at 52. 
135. NATO SOFA, supra note 120. 
136. Sinigar, 6 C.M.A. at 337, 20 C.M.R. at 53. See text accompanying notes 192-199 irifra. 
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personal supremacy over the individual, while Canadian jurisdiction is found 
upon its sovereignty in the place where the offense occurred. "137 
Up to this point, the Court followed the course it had hinted at in Robertson, 
affirming the jurisdiction of the territorial state over members of visiting 
forces, and rejecting any claim of immunity from local law. Then, however, 
the Court observed that "it is the general rule, in the absence of an inter-
national agreement, that whenever armed forces are on foreign territory in the 
service of their home state they are considered exterritorial .... "138 This 
return to the Weiman opinion was, however, soon qualified by the statement 
that this "proposition has no application here," because whenever a foreign 
soldier "lelJ,ves his camp, post, or station, not· on duty but for recreation and 
pleasure, and commits an offense, the local authorities are competent to 
punish him. "139 
The first thing to be observed about this apparent retreat to an earlier posi-
tion is that the whole discussion is, strictly speaking, dicta, since the Court 
eventually disposed of the charge against Sinigar by finding insufficient 
137. Sinigar, 6 C.M.A. at 336-37,20 C.M.R. at 52-53; (JJ:cord, United States v. Richardson, 
580 F.2d 946 (9th Cir. 1978). 
138. Sinigar, 6 C.M.A. at 337,20 C.M.R. at 53. 
139. ]d. at 337, 20 C.M.R. at 53. In support of this conclusion the Court cited 1 L. OP· 
PENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW S 445 (7th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1948). However, in the eighth edi-
tion, published in 1955, Lauterpacht retreated from the "in campIon leave" distinction, con-
cluding that" the view which has the support of the bulk of practice is that in principle members 
of visiting forces are subject to the criminal jurisdiction oflocal courts, and that any derogations 
from that principle require specific agreement of the local State by treaty or otherwise." L. OP· 
PENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW S 445 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1955). Other authorities on the 
immunity of foreign forces "in camp" are collected in Stanger, Crimina/Jurisdiction Over Visiting 
Armed Forces, 52 U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 197-209, (1957-58) 
[hereinafter cited as Stanger), and Barton, supra note 110, at 342-50. The status of forces 
agreements negotiated by the United States since World War II generally do not give the foreign 
force exclusive or primary jurisdiction over offenses committed in the camp or base. Much the 
same result is achieved in practice by giving the foreign force the primary right to exercise 
jurisdiction over offenses against other members of that force. See, e.g., Agreement in Implemen-
tation of Chapter VIII of the Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation Between the United 
States of America and Spain, September 25, 1970, United States - Spain, art. CV, 21 U.S.T. 
2259, T.I.A.S. No. 6977 [hereinafter cited as Chapter VIII Implementation Agreement); Agree-
ment Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United 
States of America and Japan, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States 
Armed Forces in Japan, January 19, 1960, United States - Japan, art. XVII, 11 U.S.T. 1652, 
T.I.A.S. No. 4510 [hereinafter cited as Agreement Under Article VI); Agreement Between the 
Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Forces, June 19, 1951, art. VII, 4 
U.S.T. 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846. The failure ofthese agreements to expressly recognize the right 
of the United States to exclusive or primary jurisdiction over "in camp" offenses by its forces is 
understandable, since there are now very few 'American' bases overseas. Almost all U.S. forces 
stationed outside the United States are located on military bases of the host nation, which U.S. 
forces have been given permission to use. Obviously, a foreign force has much less claim to ex-
clusive jurisdiction over an offense committed by one of its members on a base or camp of the host 
nation than it would if the offense had been committed in a base leased or owned by the foreign 
force, and possessed exclusively by it. Cj Barton, supra note 110, at 350 (principles of the law of 
leases are preferable to the fiction of extraterritoriality in explaining exclusive jurisdiction). In 
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evidence to support it. Nevertheless, the Court evidently intended its discus-
sion of the jurisdictional issues in Sinigar to be taken seriously, and used for 
guidance in other cases, since the bulk of the opinion is taken up with discuss-
ing these matters in detail. If this charge had not ultimately been dismissed, 
the issue of Canadian jurisdiction would have been of importance, since 
presumably it would not have been discreditable to the service for Private 
Sinigar to have refused to testify before an official who lacked jurisdiction over 
him. 
Secondly, it should be observed that this retreat is more apparent than real. 
Offenses in the 'camp, post or station' are intimately related to the 
maintenance of discipline in the force, but generally are oflittle interest to the 
local authorities. 140 Even if the host nation retains a theoretical jurisdiction 
over such offenses, as a practical matter this jurisdiction is not likely to be ex-
ercised very often. 
As a postscript to the Sinigar case, United States v. Cadenhead141 should be 
mentioned. The issue, again, was whether both the United States andJapan, 
where the offense took place, could try the accused. The issue of Japanese 
jurisdiction over American forces was dismissed with the statement that 
"American military personnel stationed in Japan on a permanent basis may 
be tried by Japan for offenses committed within its territory and punishable by 
its laws. "142 This broad recognition of local jurisdiction over foreign forces 
formally repudiated any blanket claim of immunity. As authority for this 
statement the Court relied on Girard v. Wilson,145 in which the U.S. Supreme 
Court had similarly recognized foreign jurisdiction over American forces 
abroad. Since Wilson, American authorities have generally abandoned the 
position that members of foreign forces are, in principle, immune from local 
jurisdiction. IH 
United States v. Wilmot, 11 C.M.A. 698, 29 C.M.R. 514 (1960), the Court seemed to have con-
fused leased bases, such as Guantanamo, with the bases in Japan which the United States is 
merely allowed to use under an international agreement. /d. at 700-02: A similar confusion seems 
to underlie Chief Judge Fletcher's opinion in United States v. Rivera, 4 M.J. 215 (C. M.A. 
1978), where he analogized searches conducted by U.S. Air Force personnel at the entrance to a 
Royal Thai Air Force Base to customs searches at an international border. /d. at 216. Alter-
natively, both these cases may reflect the "sociological fact" that, regardless of legal status, a 
foreign base is a community apart from the host nation, and must be able to police itself to some 
degree. See Stanger, supra, at 207-08. 
140. During World War II, two justices of the Canadian Supreme Court thus concluded that 
visiting forces were generally subject to local jurisdiction, but that in practice this jurisdiction was 
little exercised "within the lines" of the visiting force's camps. In re Exemption of United States 
Forces from Canadian Criminal Law, 12 Ann. Dig. 124 (No. 36) (1942) (per Duff, C.J.C. and 
Hudson, J.). 
141. 14 C.M.A. 271, 34 C.M.R. 51 (1963). 
142. /d. at 272-73, 34 C.M.R. at 52-53. 
143. 354 U.S. 524 (1957). 
144. Compare sources cited in note 126 supra with 1969 COURTS-MARTIAL MANUAL, supra note 
30, para. 12, [and) RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 57 (1965). 
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The Court's decisions on the status of visiting forces under customary inter-
national law may, then; be summarized as follows: 
(1) Foreign military courts are permitted to exercise jurisdiction 
over members of the force in the territory of another state. 
(2) Taken together, Rohertson, Sinigar, and CadmMad establish 
that the local authorities may also exercise jurisdiction over 
members of the foreign force, at least for offenses committed 
off-duty and outside of the camp. 
(3) Foreign military courts may treat civilians accompanying 
their force as members of that force, so long as those civil-
ians are not nationals of the state .where the trial is held. 
IV. VISmNG FORCES: THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUS 
OF FORCES AGREEMENTS 
Since 1945, the status of visiting forces has generally been determined by in-
ternational agreement between the state sending the force abroad and the 
host, or receiving, state.m For the United States, Article VII of the 1951 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Status of Forces Agreement has 
formed a model for all later negotiations concerning local jurisdiction over 
U.S. Forces.lt6 Article VII recognizes that the sending state and the receiving 
state have concurrent jurisdiction over members of visiting armed forces. The 
receiving state, however, has the primary right to exercise this jurisdiction in 
most cases. The primary right to exercise jurisdiction is in the sending state 
only if the offense "arises out" of the performance of official duty or is com-
mitted against another member of the visiting force, its civilian component, or 
a dependent of either of these.1t7 Each state promises to give "sympathetic 
consideration" to a request from the other for a waiver of its primary right to 
exercise jurisdiction. Ita This formula is so widely accepted that some 
authorities believe it reflects customary international law . 1t9 
The Court of Military Appeals has had several opportunities to construe 
145. See Coker, TheStaJus oj Visiting MilillJry Forces ill Europe: NATO SOFA, A Comparisoll, in 2 A 
TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 115 (M. Bassiouni& V. Nandaeds. 1913);Jordan, 
Cre41iOll of Cust01NJry llIImuJIioll4l Law by Way of Tre4ly, 9 A. F. JAG L. REV. 38 (1967) [hereinafter 
cited asJordan). 
146. Compare NATO SOFA, supra note 120, art. VII with Chapter VIII Implementation 
Agreement, supra note 139, art. XV [mul) Agreement Under Article VI, supra note 139, art. 
XVII. See Jordan, supra note 111. 
147. NATO SOFA, supra note 120, art. VII, para. 3. Hansen v. Hobbs, 22 C.M.A. 181,46 
C.M.R. 181 (1973), suggests that the sending state's determination that an offense arose out of 
the accused's official duty may be subject to review in the receiving state's courts. /d. at 182. 
148. NATO SOFA, supra note 120, art. VII, para. 3(c). Such a waiver need not be a formal 
act; any action evidencing a determination to end interest in and control over the case will suffice. 
United States v. Cadenhead, 14 C.M.A. 271, 276, 34 C.M.R. 51, 56 (1963). But see Whitley v. 
Aitchison, 26I.L.R. 196 (France, Court of Cas. at ion, March 25, 1958). 
149. See Jordan, supra note 145; Wijewardane, Criminal JurisdUtioll Over Visitillg Forces with 
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both the NATO Status of Forces Agreement and the parallel agreement with 
Japan. ISO Since these cases involved the interpretation of provisions common 
to most of the post-World War II agreements, their importance goes beyond 
the immediate issue in each case. This section will discuss the Court's inter-
pretation of several of these provisions. 
A. The Civilian Component 
Most status of forces agreements deal with the privileges and status of not 
only the sending state's military forces, but also the .'civilian component' of 
those forces. In Robertson, 151 the prosecution argued that a merchant seaman 
on a vessel bringing supplies to the armed forces in Japan was subject to court-
martial jurisdiction as part of the' civilian component' under the Administra-
tive Agreement with Japan. Under Article I(B) of that Agreement the civilian 
component was defined as including" civilian persons of United States nation-
ality who are in the employ of, serving with, or accompanying the United 
States armed forces in Japan .... " 152 
In a well-written opinion by Judge Brosman, the Court noted that this 
definition clearly paralleled Article 2( 11) of the Uniform Code of Military 
J ustice.153 While not employed by the armed forces, Robertson was, under ex-
isting precedents, 'accompanying' the armed forces within the meaning of Ar-
ticle 2( 11).15* Parallel language alone was not, however, sufficient to convince 
the Court that an international agreement should be given the same meaning 
as a domestic statute. The Court then examined in detail both U.S. and 
Japanese practices in implementing the Agreement. 155 Access to American 
post exchanges, use of military payment certificates, procedures for entry and 
exit from Japan and official minutes of the Joint Committee established to im-
plement the Agreement were all considered by the Court, together with its 
declared intention to narrowly construe grants of extraterritorial jurisdiction, 
in deciding that Robertson was not part of the civilian component. 156 
The definition of civilian component in the Japanese Agreement was 
broader than that in the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, which requires 
SlNewl Reference 10 Intemo.lioMi Forces, 41 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 122, 14-6 (1965-66) [hereinafter cited 
as Wijewardane]. 
150. Japan Administrative Agreement, supra note 125. 
151. 5 C.M.A. 806, 19 C.M.R. 102 (1955). 
152. Administrative Agreement under Article III of the Security Treaty Between the United 
States of America and with Japan, Feb. 28, 1952, United States - Japan, art. I(b), 3 U.S.T. 
3341, T.I.A.S. No. 2492. For the brief history of this agreement, see Wijewardane, supra note 
149, at 167-68. The same definition appears in Agreement Under Article VI, supra note 139, art. 
I(b). 
153. Robertson, 5 C.M.A. at 815, 19 C.M.R. at 111. 
154. See, e.g., AYCOCK & WURFEL, supra note 8, at 54-57. 
155. Robertson, 5 C.M.A. at 815-18,19 C.M.R. at 111-14-. 
156. Id. 
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that members of the civilian component be both "accompanying the armed 
forces" and "in the employ of an armed service" of the sending state. 157 
Under the NATO formula, merchant seamen'such as Robertson would even 
more clearly not be part of the the civilian component. 
B. Mutual Assistance 
1. Searches 
The NATO Status of Forces Agreement provides that the "authorities of 
the receiving and sending states shall assist each other in the carrying out of all 
necessary investigations into offenses, and in the collection and production of 
evidence .... "158 Frequently, offenses in the concurrent jurisdiction of both 
the United States and the receiving state are initially investigated by the local 
authorities but eventually tried by the United States. In these situations the 
admissibility of certain evidence before the American court-martial will often 
depend on the degree of American involvement in the initial investigation. 
The Court first considered this problem in United States v. DeLeo. 159 A 
French police inspector requested the assistance of the American military 
authorities in interviewing Corporal DeLeo on his involvement in illegal cur-
rency transactions. Ordered to report to his company commander's office, 
DeLeo found the French inspector waiting for him along with an agent of the 
Army's Criminal Investigation Division. The latter informed him he was 
under arrest and searched l,lis person, after ~hich his automobile was 
searched. After these searches, all three proceeded to Bordeaux to search 
DeLeo's apartment. During. the course of this .search the U.S. Army agent 
noticed, ~d seized, evidence of a forgery unrdated to the French investiga-
tion. DeLeo was eventually convicted of this forgery by a court-martial. 160 
The search of the apartment was conducted in accordance with letters 
rogatory issued by a French magistrate, though it did not meet the standards 
of the Fourth Amendment. 161 While the French authorities could not, ob-
viously, be held to the standards of the United States Constitution, on appeal 
DeLeo argued that the Army agent was so intimately involved in the search 
that .it should be considered an American enterprise. 162 Rejecting this argu-
ment, the Court of Military Appeals pointed to paragraph 6(a) of Article VII. 
157. NATO SOFA, supra note 120, art. I, para. l(b). 
158. !d. art. VII, para. 6(a). 
159. 5 C.M.A. 148, 17 C.M.R.148 (1954). 
160. !d. at 153, 17 C.M.R. at 153. 
161. !d. at 171, 17 C.M.R. at 171 (Latimer,]., dissenting). 
162. !d. at 155-57, 17 C.M.R. at 155-57. 
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In light of the American obligation to assist the French police, 
a set of facts which in the United States would lead unerringly to 
the conclusion that a Federal investigator's presence at the search 
was attributable to a desire to obtain evidence . . . would in a 
foreign country suggest only that he was seeking to assist the local 
officials as required by the Status of Forces Agreement. 163 
339 
The Court thus construed paragraph 6(a) as requiring, or in any event 
authorizing, a broad range of activities in support of the local authorities. As 
the dissenting judge pointed out, in DeLeo's case the Army went far beyond 
merely making him available to the French police, or even observing the 
French investigation to ensure that no improprieties occurred. 1M Instead, the 
U.S. investigator became actively involved in conducting searches under 
French authority. 
In concluding that paragraph 6(a) authorized such activities, the Court, in 
contrast to its approach in Robertson, made no effort to consider the negotiating 
history of this paragraph, or any other aspect of its context. Instead, it was 
simply assumed that this degree of participation in a foreign search was what 
paragraph 6(a) contemplated. In fact, the negotiating history of the NATO 
Status of Forces Agreement suggests that this paragraph was chiefly intended 
to counteract some of the effects of paragraph 10(a) of Article VII, which 
authorizes visiting forces to police their own camps, establishments or other 
premises. 165 During the negotiations some delegations feared that this right 
would be used to prevent local authorities from serving process inside foreign 
camps. 166 Paragraph 6( a) appears to have been intended to place an obligation 
on camp commanders to assist the local police in such situations, and not im-
pede them. It was contemplated that the camp commander would either per-
mit the local police to enter his command, surrender and request person to 
them, or see that the process was served in the camp. 167 There was no sugges-
tion that the camp authorities would themselves become actively involved in 
local investigations. 
The incongruities latent in the DeLeo decision became apparent in United 
States v. Schnell. 168 In November, 1972, an Army Criminal Investigation Divi-
sion agent received information indicating that Private Schnell had illegal 
163. [d. at 156 n. 2, 17 C.M.R. at 156 n. 2. 
164. ld. at 163, 17 C.M.R. at 163 (Latimer, J., dissenting). 
165. Regularly constituted military units or formations of a force shall have the right to 
police any camps, establishments or other premises which they occupy as the result of 
an agreement with the receiving state. The military police of the force may take all ap-
propriate measures to ensure the maintenance of order and security on such premises. 
NATO SOFA, supra note 120, art. VII, para. 100a). 
166. See Snee, supra note 120, at 105-06. 
167. ld. 
168. 23 C.M.A. 464, 50 C.M.R. 483 (1975). 
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drugs in his off-base apartment in Germany. He gave this information to a 
German police investigator, who obtained authority to search in accordance 
with German law. The Army agent then apprehended the accused, hand-
cuffed him when he became beligerent, and brought him to the apartment at 
the request of the German police. He then, again at their request, went to the 
accused's barracks to search for the keys to the apartment and gave them to 
the German police. Although German police conducted the search, the 
evidence found was eventually used in a court-martial for possession of illegal 
drugs. 169 
On appeal, the government argued, on the basis of DeLeo, that the Army 
agent's activity was justified by paragraph 6( a) .since possession of illegal drugs 
was an offense in the primary jurisdiction of the host nation. 170 Rejecting this 
argument, the Court held that paragraph 6(a) did not authorize apprehending 
the accused and bringing him to the scene of the search because it "relates 
only to assistance in the collection of evidence" and "does not deal with the 
seizure or apprehension of a person." 171 The Court reached this conclusion 
despite Section 106 of the German Code of Criminal Procedure, which pro-
vided that: 
The owner of the rooms or objects may be present at the search. In 
the event he is absent his representative or a grown-up relative, 
fellow-lodger or neighbor shall, if possible, be called in to assist. 172 
The Court did not regard this as sufficient authority for bringing Schnell to 
the apartment, apparently because the statute did not absolutely require the 
owner of the search property to be present. Since the Status of Forces Agree-
ment did not justify the agent's activity, the Court concluded that the search 
was a joint effort of the American and German police. American Constitu-
tional standards therefore applied, with the result that the evidence was im-
properly admitted, and Schnell's conviction reversed.173 
In contrast to DeLeo, in Schnell the Court gave an extremely narrow con-
struction to paragraph 6(a). It now applied only to the production of objects, 
not persons, an interpretation contrary to the negotiating history discussed 
above. 174 Even the limited cooperation authorized by this construction was ap-
parently further limited to include only those acts absolutely required by the 
169. Id. at 465, 50 C.M.R. at 484. 
170. /d. at 468-69, 50 C.M.R. at 487-88. 
171. /d. at 469, 50 C.M.R. at 488. 
172. Id. at 468,50 C.M.R. at 487. 
173. /d. at 470, 50 C.M.R. at 489. 
174. The Court found that the "seizure or apprehension of a person" was "covered" by 
paragraph 5(c) of Article VII of NATO SOFA, supra note 120, which authorizes the sending state 
to retain "custody" of a suspect until he is charged by the receiving state. United States v. 
Schnell, 23 C.M.A. at 469, 50 C.M.R. at 488. Since Schnell had not been charged by the Ger-
man authorities at the time of the search, it was reasoned that the United States had no duty to 
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law of the host nation. Like the opinion in DeLeo, the Court in Schnell handed 
these decisions down by fiat, with little analysis of the treaty or its context. 175 
The true basis for the decision appears to have been the Court's suspicion 
that the entire German search was merely a subterfuge to avoid compliance 
with the Fourth Amendment. A 1963 supplementary agreement between the 
United States and the Federal Republic of Germany provided that the latter 
would ordinarily waive its primary right to exercise jurisdiction in cases where 
American and German jurisdiction was concurrent.176 Taking judicial notice 
of this agreement, the Court inferred that the Army investigator must have 
known that the case would undoubtedly come before a court-martial rather 
than a German court, and that the entire transaction to 'assist' the German 
police was therefore a sham.177 Bound by the trial court's finding of fact that 
the agent's testimony was truthful, the Court produced a strained interpreta-
tion of paragraph 6(a) as a means of redressing an evasion of the accused's 
Fourth Amendment rights. The decision does not represent a proper inter-
pretation of paragraph 6(a), and should be disregarded as a statement of inter-
national law. Indeed, as we shall see later, the Court itself has retreated 
somewhat from the Schnell interpretation of 6(a). 
As a postscript to Schnell, it should be noted that the Court later attempted a 
radical solution to the problem of conflict between the Fourth Amendment 
and paragraph 6(a). In United States v. Jordan I 78 the Court overruled DeLeo and 
severed the relationship between the duty of U.S. forces to cooperate in local 
investigations and the admissibility of evidence produced by those investiga-
tions. Hereafter, Fourth Amendment standards will apply to the admissibility 
of all evidence produced by searches at which any American official is present, 
even if merely as an observer, or in which the American authorities had aided 
the foreign police in any way.179 While the Court recognized that the Status of 
Forces Agreement, as the 'law of the land,' required that such assistance be 
given, it held that this was irrelevant to the constitutional issue of evidence ad-
. missibility .180 While this approach is preferable to that in Schnell in the limited 
furnish his person to the German investigators. /d. The Court completely neglected the broader 
language of paragraph 5( a) of Article VII: 
The authorities of the receiving and sending states shall assist each other in the arrest of 
members of a force or civilian component ... and in handing them over to the authority 
which is to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with the [terms of Article VII]. 
NATO SOFA, supra note 120, art. VII, para. 5(a). 
175. S,hJll!ll, 23 C.M.A. at 469-70, 50 C.M.R. at 488-89. 
176. Agreement to Supplement the Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic 
Treat Regarding the Status of Their Forces, With Respect to Foreign Forces Stationed in the 
Federal Republic of Germany, Aug. 3, 1959, United States-West Germany, art. 19, 14 U.S.T. 
531, T.I.A.S. No. 5351. 
177. SchJll!ll, 23 C.M.A. at 467, 50 C.M.R. at 486. 
178. 23 C.M.A. 525, 50 C.M.R. 664, modified, 1 M.J. 334 (1976). 
179. /d. at 527,50 C.M.R. at 666. 
180. /d. at 528,50 C.M.R. at 667. 
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sense that it avoids a strained construction of international obligations, it 
achieves this by simply ignoring those obligations. In general, Jordan displays 
a lack of sensitivity to transnational considerations. 181 
2. Interrogations 
In contrast to the Court's erratic course on the subject of foreign searches, 
its treatment of foreign interrogations has been remarkably consistent over the 
years. Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, a precursor of 
Miranda v. Arizona, 182 requires that a person suspected of a military crime be 
advised, before interrogation, of his right to r~main silent, of the possibility 
that any statement made might be used against him at a court-martial and of 
the nature of the accusation against him.185 At present, both Article 31 and 
Miranda apply to military interrogations. 184 In several cases accused persons 
have argued that their statements to foreign police officials should not be ad" 
mitted before courts-martial for failure to comply with these statutory and 
constitutional warning requirements. 
The issue was first raised in United States v. Grishllm. 185 In Grisham, the Court 
held that the mere presence ofU .S. military police observers at a French inter-
rogation, coupled with the use of an American military interpreter, did not 
make the interrogation a joint U.S.-French operation requiring the giving of 
Article 31 warnings. 186 Paragraph 6(a) of Article VII first appears in United 
States v. Plante,187 where an Army investigator located the accused and 
'directed' him to accompany him to the French police for interrogation on 
blackmarketing activities. The investigator later observed the interrogation, 
during which Plante made incriminatory statements. Concluding that in this 
case, too, there was no joint operation, the Court "made reference to" 
paragraph. 6( a) as a justific~tion for the Army agent's delivery of the accused 
to the French authorities. 188 
In answer to the accused's suggestion that the agent should have advised 
him under Article 31 prior to delivering him to the French authorities, the 
Court held that such a rule would have come from Congressional enactment 
rather than judicial decision. The Court noted that Congress has the power, in 
181. See Carnahan, United States v. Jordan: Foreign Searches, Military Courts and the Act of Stale Doc-
trine, 19 A. F. L. REV. 413 (1978). 
182. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
183. Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 31, 10 U.S.C. S 831 (1976). 
184. See United States v. Tempia, 16 C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967). 
185. 4 C.M.A. 694, 16 C.M.R. 268 (1954). 
186. /d. at 697, 16C.M.R. at 271. 
187. 13 C.M.A. 266, 270-71, 32 C.M.R. 266, 270-71 (1962). 
188. /d. at 271,32 C.M.R. at 271. The Court also correctly concluded that paragraph 5(c), 
article VII, was immaterial on the issue of assistance to the local police, a position from which it 
unfortunately later retreated. /d. at 272. See note 174 supra. 
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U.S. internal law, to pass statutes prohibiting the implementation of a 
treaty.189 It was strongly implied that warning an accused of his right to re-
main silent before delivery to foreign authorities would be "in derogation of" 
the Status of Forces Agreement, presumably because the accused's silence 
would interfere with the local investigation rather than assisting it. 190 
In United States v. Jones, 191 decided in 1979, the Court reconsidered the Plante 
decision in light of Jordan. At the request of the German authorities, the Army 
had made Private Jones available for interrogation and had allowed the 
German investigator to use a U.S. military interview room for that purpose. 
Other than Jones, no Americans were in the room during the interview. The 
result was a written statement used atJones' court-martial for larceny, assault 
and battery. 192 
On appeal, the accused urged the Court to overrule Grisham and Plante. 
Since the supplemental argeement between the United States and Germany 
created a high likelihood that any case investigated by the Germans would ac-
tually be tried by a U.S. court-martial, he argued that American officials 
should have given him the Article 31 and Miranda warnings before delivering 
him to German interrogation. 195 Alternatively, he argued that the German 
practice of waiving jurisdiction required that the German investigator give 
him these warnings. 194 
Rejecting these arguments, the Court reaffirmed the general approach in 
Gn'sham and Plante. 195 Merely delivering the accused to the German authorities 
and providing a place for the interview did not make the interrogation an 
American enterprise. The Court referred several times to paragraph 6(a) of 
Article VII as justifying these acts.196 These references take on added signifi-
cance from the fact that theJones opinion was written by Judge Cook, who also 
authored Schnell. The Court seems, therefore, to have returned to a broader 
interpretation of paragraph 6(a). This interpretation, supported both by the 
negotiating history of the Agreement and the administrative practice of the 
parties, authorizes the deliverly of persons to the host nation's investigators as 
well as physical evidence, at least under some circumstances. 197 
C. Multiple Trials for the Same Offense 
All developed legal systems recognize that a person should not be placed in 
189. United States v. Plante, 13 C.M.A. at 272, 32 C.M.R. at 272. 
190. [d. at 272-73, 32 C.M.R. at 272-73. 
191. 6 M.J. 226 (C.M.A. 1979). 
192. /d. at 227. 
193. /d. at 227-28. 
194. /d. at 227. 
195. [d. at 228-30. 
196. /d. at 227. 
197. See note 174 supra. Cj Autry v. Hyde, 19 C.M.A. 433, 42 C.M.R. 35 (1970). 
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jeopardy twice for the same offense. lg8 Customary international law does not, 
however, prohibit two or more nations from punishing an individual for the 
same offense, so long as each had prescriptive jurisdiction over the offense and 
enforcement jurisdiction over the accused. 199 To ameliorate' this situation in 
the visiting forces context, the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, and the 
agreements patterned after it, provide as follows: 
Where an accused has been tried in accordance with the provisions 
of this Article by the authorities of one Contracting Party and has 
been acquitted, or has been convicted and is serving, or has served 
his sentence or has been pardoned, he may not be tried again for 
the same offense within the same territory by the authorities of 
another Contracting Party. 200 
In Sinigar, it will be recalled, the accused was summarily judged in contempt 
for his refusal to answer questions during a Canadian coroner's inquest, and 
later faced a court-martial for the same act. 201 On appeal, he argued that his 
temporary imprisonment by the coroner should, under the Status of Forces 
Agreement, have barred his trial by the U.S. authorities. 202 "We are met at 
the outset," said the Court, "with the question of whether the accused was 
'tried' by the Canadian court within the meaning of the word as used in the 
quoted paragraph. "203 The answer to this question was said to depend on 
whether Canadian law viewed contempt proceedings as a 'trial.' Lacking 
evidence on this issue, the Court inferred that, since Canada was also a 
common-law jurisdiction, its law would be the same as U.S. federallaw. 204 In 
the federal court system, summary contempt proceedings were found to be sui 
generis, and not characterized as trials. 205 The Court therefore ruled against 
Sinigar on this issue. 
It is not clear why the Court chose to turn an international law problem into 
a foreign law problem. The issue in Sinigar properly should have been the 
meaning of the term 'trial' in the Agreement, in relation to the actual nature 
of the Canadian proceeding against the accused. Whether Canada regarded 
198. See Oehler, Recognition oj Foreign PtnlJlJudgmmts and Their Enforcement, in 2 A TREATISE ON 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 261 (M. Bassiouni & V. Nanda eds. 1973) [hereinafter cited as 
Oehler). 
199. [d.; if. United States v. Richardson, 580 F.2d 946 (9th Cir. 1978)'-
200. NATO SOFA, supra note 120, art. VII, para. 8; if. European Convention on the Inter-
national Validity of Criminal Judgments, May 28, 1970, art. 53, Europ. T.S. No. 10, reprinted in 
Oehler, supra note 198, at 304; Treaty with Canada on the Execution of Penal Sentences, United 
States-Canada, March 2, 1977,art. VI, __ U.S.T. __ , T.I.A.S. No. __ . SeegenerallyWije-
wardane, supra note 149, at 173-75. 
201. 6 C.M.A. at 330,20 C.M.R. at 46 (1955). 
202. !d. at 337,20 C.M.R. at 53. 
203. !d. 
204. !d. at 338, 20 C.M.R. at 54. 
205. [d. See McHardy, Military Contempt Law and Procedure, 55 MIL. L. REV. 131, 144 (1972). 
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. such proceedings as trials might be a relevant consideration, but it should not 
have been treated as decisive of the issue. Perhaps the Court gave undue 
weight to the fact that the restriction on a second trial only applied "in the 
same territory" as the first trial. The Court's unspoken assumption may have 
been that this phrase indicated an intent to protect the sensitivities of the 
receiving state, so that the primary focus should be on whether it would regard 
the court-martial as a second trial. 
The negotiating history provides no enlightenment as to the policy actually 
behind the "in the same territory" phrase, though it appears to have origi-
nated with the United States. 206 The discussions of this paragraph as a whole 
indicate that it was intended to protect the individual against double jeopardy 
rather than the interests of either the sending or receiving state. 207 At one 
point in the negotiations it was pointed out that the "in the same territory" 
phrase whould permit multiple trials in different territories. 208 The Juridical 
Subcommittee, where the issue was raised, agreed that this would be per-
mitted, "but hoped that in practice no such cases would arise," since as a 
practical matter all trials would probably have to be held wherever the 
witnesses were. 209 The purpose of this phrase remains obscure, as does the 
Court's technique of interpretation in Sinigar. 
Quite a different approach was taken in United States v. Cadenhead,2lO where 
the accused had been subject to Japanese Family Court proceedings before his 
trial by court-martial for the same offense. The Court's opinion was written 
by Chief Judge Quinn, who had already expressed" a number of reservations 
regarding the reasoning" of the majority opinion in Sinigar. 211 Again the issue 
was whether host nation proceedings were to be considered a trial within the 
Executive Agreement between the United States and Japan; the double 
jeopardy language in this agreement was identical to that in the NATO Agree-
ment. 212 
The Chief Judge's opinion pointed out that the paragraph in question, as 
well as the rest of the article on criminal jurisdiction, consistently used words 
and phrases" commonly and intimately associated with proceedings under the 
regular penal law of the state," e.g., "acquitted," "convicted," "sentence," 
and "pardoned."213 Also, the official proceedings of the Joint Commmittee 
appointed to implement the Agreement pointed in the same direction, since 
206. SNEE, supra note 120, at 104·05. The U.S. draft containing this language appears, 
however, to have been influenced by the Italian suggestion that the principle of no doublejeopar· 
dy "normally applied only to jurisdiction within the territorial limits of one country." [d. at 104. 
207. /d. 
208. [d. at 104-06. 
209. [d. at 112. 
210. 14 C.M.A. 271, 34 C.M.R. 51 (1963). 
211. Sinigar, 6 C.M.A. at 340,20 C.M.R. at 56 (1955) (Quinn, C.J., concurring). 
212. United States v. Cadenhead, 14 C.M.A. at 273, 34 C.M.R. at 53. 
213. /d. at 274-75,34 C.M.R. at 54-55. See Wijewardane, supra note 149, at 175. 
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they referred to the requirement for an indictment in certain cases. 214 The 
opinion therefore concluded that this paragraph of the Agreement "con-
templates a proceeding directly intended to vindicate the penallaw."215 
However, expert testimony at the trial indicated that Japanese Family 
Court proceedings were "educative, not punitive," and that the key idea 
behind them was "guardianship. "216 The disposition of the accused's case lent 
support to this testimony, since the Family Court had, after several hearings, 
concluded that since the accused were "foreigners" it would have been im-
possible to have applied the 'educative' policy of the Japanese Juvenile Law to 
them.217 The Court of Military Appeals therefore concluded that the Family 
Court proceeding was not a "trial" within the meaning of the Executive 
Agreement, and affirmed the conviction by court-martial. 
The differences between the approaches in Sinigar and Cadenhead can be il-
lustrated by examining how each would affect the right of a host nation to try 
an individual after certain American actions were taken against him for the 
same offense. It is generally agreed that a decision by military authorities not 
to prosecute would not bar a later trial by the host nation. 218 Under Article 15 
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, however, a commanding officer may 
impose "nonjudicial punishment" on persons under his command for minor 
offenses against the Code. 219 The Court of Military Appeals has also held that 
at least for some purposes punishment by a Summary Court-Martial is not to 
be considered a prior conviction by a court.220 Under the theory adopted in 
Sinigar, neither Article 15 punishment nor trial by a Summary Court-Martial 
would bar subsequent trial for the same offense by the receiving state, since in 
neither case would these proceedings be considered a trial under the law of the 
United States, the state holding the proceeding. Under the Cadenhead, ap-
proach, however, a Summary Court-Martial would certainly bar a subsequent 
foreign trial since Summary Courts-Martial are "directly intended to vin-
dicate the [military] penal law" by punishing violators of that law. 221 
'Nonjudicial punishment,' as the name implies, is also punishment for 
violation of military penal law. The official Manual for Courts-Martial, 
214. Cadm/Jead, 14 C.M.A. at 275, 34 C.M.R. at 55. 
215. /d. at 274, 34 C.M.R. at 54. 
216. /d. at 275, 34 C.M.R. at 55. 
217. 1d. at 272, 34 C.M.R. at 52. 
218. See Whitley v. Aitchison, 23 I.L.R.· 255 (France, Court of Appeal of Paris, May 16, 
1956), rev'd on other gToundr,261.L.R. 196 (Court of Cassation , March 25,1958); SNEE,supra note 
120, at 104, para. 8; Wijewardane, supra note 149, at 175. 
219. Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 15, 10 U.S.C. S 815 (1976). 
220. See United States v. Booker, 5 M.J. 238 (C.M.A. 1977). A summary court-martial con-
sists of one officer, and its sentence may not exceed one month's confinement and forfeiture of 
two-thirds of one month's pay. Uniform Code of Military Justice, arts. 16,20, 10 U.S.C. SS 816, 
820 (1976). . . 
221. Cadmluad, 14 C.M.A. at 274, 34 C.M.R. at 54. 
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however, states that these punishments are" primarily corrective in nature," 
i.e., intended primarily to rehabilitate the offender rather than to 'vindicate' 
the law. 222 Also, to consider such proceedings a 'trial' in the sense of the Status 
of Forces Agreement would do violence to both the ordinary and legal mean-
ings of those terms. Although the accused person is given notice of the charge 
and an opportunity to present matter in his defense, Article 15 proceedings are 
conducted in quite an informal manner and lack most of the indicia of a 
trial. 223 It is, therefore, doubtful whether such punishments would bar a subse-
quent trial under the Cadenhead standard. Chief Judge Quinn's emphasis on 
the implications of the terms 'sentence' and 'convicted,' terms which are not 
technically applicable to Article 15 any more than they are to Japanese Family 
Court proceedings, suggests that he would find that Article 15 punishments 
would not bar a subsequent foreign trial. 22+ 
D. Other Rights of an Accused Person 
In addition to the guarantee against multiple trials, the status of forces 
agreements to which the United States is a party all contain an enumeration of 
procedural rights to which the accused "shall be entitled. "225 This language 
implies that the Agreement creates rights for individual persons affected by it, 
and not merely the states party to it. This conclusion is reinforced by the 
Cadenheo.d and Sinigar opinions, where the Court of Military Appeals did not 
222. 1969 COURTS-MARTIAL MANUAL, su/mz note 30, para. 129(b). 
223. There is thus no proceeding before a judicial officer or "court." Cj Wijewardane, supra 
note 149, at 175. Nor does punishment under Article 15 necessarily bar later trial by court-
martial. Compare 1969 COURTS-MARTIAL MANUAL, supra note 30, para. 215(c), with Whitley v. 
Aitchison, 23 I.L.R. 255 (France, Court of Appeal of Paris, May 16, 1956). 
224. Cadenlutui, 14 C.M.A. at 274-76, 34 C.M.R. at 54-56. 
225. E.g., NATO SOFA, supra note 120, art. VII, para. 9: 
Whenever a member of a force or civilian component or a dependent is prosecuted 
under the jurisdiction of a receiving State he shall be entitled -
/d. 
(a) to a prompt and speedy trial; 
(b) to be informed, in advance oftrial, ofthe specific charge or charges made against 
him; 
(c) to be confronted with the witnesses against him; 
(d) to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, if they are within 
the jurisdiction of the receiving State; 
(e) to have legal representation of his own choice for his defense or to have free or 
assisted legal representation under the conditions prevailing for the time being in the 
receiving State; 
(f) if he considers it necessary, to have the services of a competent interpreter; and 
(g) to communicate with a representative of the Government of the sending State 
and, when the rules of the court permit, to have such a representative present at his 
trial. 
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hesitate to regard individuals as having standing to raise the issue of prior trial 
by foreign authorities. 
In United States v. Carter,226 however, the Court sweepingly announced that 
the NATO" Status of Forces Agreement confers no individual right and most 
assuredly seeks only to preserve those protections presently existing. "227 In a 
sense, the statement that a status of forces agreement does not confer in-
dividual rights is only a corollary of the Court's earlier holding that such 
agreements are intended to define the rights and obligations of governments, 
and not to place enforcible obligations on individuals. 228 Further examination, 
however, suggests that this statement should be limited to the facts in Carter. 
Carter arose out of a search executed by American military authorities in the 
accused's off-base housing in France. He occupied this housing under a con-
tract between the United States and the French corporation owning the 
buildings, under which the United States agreed to see that the housing was 
fully occupied and the owner agreed to rent only to Americans. In light of this 
special situation, the French police had earlier agreed that the U.S. military 
authorities could perform searches in these buildings without making prior ar-
rangements with the French authorities. H9 
The search and seizure in Carter's case had been carried out under this 
agreement, but without securing the permission of a French magistrate as re-
quired by French law. 230 On appeal, the defense argued that this evidence 
should have been excluded because it had been taken in violation of various 
provisions of the Status of Forces Agreement, most notably Article II, which 
required the forces of the sending state to "respect the law of the receiving 
State. "231 In this context, the Court correctly concluded that the military 
authorities had violated no individual rights of the accused. The provisions 
cited all seem clearly intended to protect the interests of the various states 
party to the Agreement, rather than those of individuals. 232 The Carter opinion 
should not, however, be interpreted as holding that none of the Articles of the 
Agreement create rights for individuals. 
This conclusion is supported by the Court's statement that the Agreement 
226. 16 C.M.A. 277, 36 C.M.R. 433 (1966). 
227. /d. at 281, 36 C.M.R. at 437; if. United States v. Rodriguez, 2 C.M.A. 101,6 C.M.R. 
101 (1952) (Executive agreement with Mexico on liability of its citizens to draft created rights for 
state, not individual; alternative holding). 
228. See United States v. Ekenstam, 7 C.M.A. 168, 21 C.M.R. 294 (1956). 
229. United States v. Carter, 16 C.M.A. at 279-80, 36 C.M.R. at 435-36. 
230. ld. at 280, 36 C.M.R. at 436. 
231. NATO SOFA, supra note 120, art. II. 
232. In addition to Article II, the Carter Court cited NATO SOFA, supra note 120, art. VII, 
paras. 6(a) (the authorities of the sending and receiving states to assist each other in searches), 
10(a) (sending state has right to police its installations), and 10(b) (military police of sending state 
not to be employed off their installation except in liaison with receiving state authorities). These 
provisions are plainly intended to protect the sovereignty of the receiving state; there is no reason 
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preserves "protections presently existing. "233 The Court listed the rights 
"thus preserved" as including speedy trial, notice of charges, confrontation of 
witnesses, compulsory process for obtaining witnesses, legal representation, a 
competent interpreter, communication with representatives of the sending 
state, and their presence at trial. 234 These rights were 'preserved' rather than 
'created' by the Agreement in the sense that an American serviceman would 
have enjoyed these rights if tried before an American court-martial or civilian 
court rather than a European tribunal. 
Although the Court did not consult the negotiating history of the Agree-
ment, this interpretation is. supported by that history. The listing of specific 
rights was proposed by the United States delegation, and these safeguards 
were described as being "in conformity with the procedures followed in the 
United States. "235 The other NATO powers generally acquiesced in the 
American proposal that specific rights be guaranteed to members of the visit-
ing forces tried by the receiving state.236 Undoubtedly, this was because all 
parties concerned recognized that the United States would be the principal 
'sending state' under the Agreement. This part of the Agreement does, there-
fore, seem to have been intended to 'preserve' specifically American due proc-
ess rights, as those rights were understood in 1949. 
CONCLUSION 
Judge Baxter has noted the uneven quality of the international law opinions 
of most American courtS. 237 The decisions of the Court of Military Appeals fit 
into this pattern. The carefully written opinion in Schultz must thus be 
balanced against the summary treatment accorded to international legal issues 
in, for example, United States v. Rivera, m where the Court upheld a gate search 
conducted at a U.S. Air Force installation in Thailand by analogizing it to a 
customs search at an international border. In disposing of this case, it would 
appear that the Court might profitably have examined such issues as the legal 
status of foreign bases and the right of foreign armed forces to defend them-
selves against introduction of contraband into their camps. Yet, the Court not 
why a national of the sending state should have standing to object to a violation of them, or be 
able to claim rights under them. Concern with state sovereignty, rather than individual rights, is 
also apparent in the negotiating history of paragraphs 10(a) and (b). See Snee, supra note 120, at 
112-13. Cf United States ex rei. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir.), etrl. denied, 421 U.S. 
1001 (1975) (articles ofOAS and UN Charters protecting sovereignty of members held to create 
no individual rights). But see United States v. Reagan, 7 M.J. 490 (C.M.A. 1979) (Fletcher, 
C.J.). 
233. Carter, 16 C.M.A. at 281, 36 C.M.R. at 437. 
234. Id. at 282. 36 C.M.R. at 438. 
235. Snee, supra Ilote 120, at 65. 
236. Id. at 106-08. 
237. Baxter, supra note 78, at vii-ix. 
238. 4 M.J. 215 (C.M.A. 1978). 
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only chose to totally ignore international law in its opinion, but went on to 
base its decision on the analogy which, with its implication that the United 
States was somehow sovereign over its bases in Thailand, would inevitably 
tend to offend the Thai government. Again, the painstaking care taken in 
Robertson and Cadenhead to interpret properly inter,national agreements can be 
contrasted with the superficial techniques used in Schnell. 
As a source of international law , the Court has consistently preferred to rely 
on decisions of the United States Supreme Court to the exclusion of all other 
sources. While this preference is perhaps understandable in a lower federal 
court, many important sources of evidence of international law, such as the 
decisions of foreign courts and international tribunals, have been virtually ig-
nored as a result. 239 The Court's opinions on national jurisdiction would, for 
example, have been considerably strengthened by references to the decision of 
the Permanent Court of International Justice in S. S. Lotus. 
Similarly, even the Court's best opinions on the interpretation of treaties 
have failed to look to the negotiating history for guidance. There may, indeed, 
be both legal and practical reasons for this. Even for a court sitting in Wash-
ington' D.C., negotiating history is often inaccessible to both the court and 
counsel.2·o Also, the subsequent practice of states in executing the treaty may 
often be a better aid to interpretation than negotiating history. 2.1 Still, the 
Court should make more than the minimal use of negotiating history which 
has characterized its past practice. 2.2 
In recent years, the Court has, sadly, produced fewer skillfully done opin-
ions dealing with international law . In part, this may be due to changes in the 
Court's personnel, and other factors beyond its control.2·' However, its sub-
• 239. This author has not found any cases in which the Court cited an international tribunal. 
Only in Catimhead did the Court cite a foreign decision on international law. 14 C.M.A. at 276, 
34 C.M.R. at 56 (1963). . 
240. See Proving InlmllJtional Law in a National Forum, 70 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AM. SOC'Y OF 
INT'LLAW 10,13-15 (1976). Note, however, that the negotiating history of the NATO SOFA has 
been published. See SNEE, supra note 93. 
241. Thus, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. 
AlConf. 39/27 (1969), reprinted in 8 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 679 (1969), lists negotiating history 
("preparatory work") as a supplementary means of interpretation, id. art. 32, to be resorted to 
only if other means, id. art. 31, including "subsequent practice in the application of the treaty" 
yield absurd or ambiguous results. 
242. In Cadmluad, 14 C.M.A. 271, 34 C.M.R. 51 (1963), the Court referred to the fact that 
the double jeopardy provisions of the SOFA with Japan had been derived from the NATO 
SOFA, and had been included in the NATO SOFA at the request of the United States. Id. at 
273. No conclusions were drawn from this brief nod to negotiating history, and in no other case 
has the Court gone even this far. 
243. The original judges on the Court had all served in World War II in capacities giving 
them a familiarity with the administration of military law, including, undoubtedly, its interna-
tional aspects. See Willis, supra note 3, at 71 nn. 167-69. The present members of the Court, by 
contrast, came to the Court with distinguished backgrounds in domestic American law, but such 
backgrounds would give them little contact with international legal problems. See Cooke, supra 
note 3, at 45 n. 3, 49-50 n. '19. 
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ject matter jurisdiction still provides the Court of Military Apeals unique op-
portunities to creatively apply international law in many of its decisions, if it 
will only take up these opportunities and make use of this available body of 
law. This would result in the constructive development of international law as 
well as an improvement in the craftsmanship of the Court's decision and opin-
ions. 
